This is concept is surprisingly complex. Once the attacker sees the
secure dialog, what prevents them from using the same techniques
and/or code to create a visually identical spoof? There have been
several OS-level designs to create hardware-supported secure dialogs.
Needless to say, these
Anne Lynn Wheeler pointed out:
Face and fingerprints swiped in Dutch biometric passport crack
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/01/30/dutch_biometric_passport_crack/
Didn't the EU adopt the same design that the US uses?
Am I right to presume that the passport RFID chip used by the Dutch is
On Feb 1, 2006, at 3:50 AM, Travis H. wrote:
On 1/28/06, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
In our office, we have a shredder that happily
takes CDs and is designed to do so. It is noisy
and cost $500.
Here's one for $40, although it doesn't appear to shred them so much
as make them
On Wed, Feb 01, 2006 at 02:03:10PM -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
| Anne Lynn Wheeler pointed out:
|
| Face and fingerprints swiped in Dutch biometric passport crack
| http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/01/30/dutch_biometric_passport_crack/
|
| Didn't the EU adopt the same design that the US
I have an Executive Machines EPS-1501X cross-cut
shredder (15 sheet, I think) which also shreds CDs.
And it really shreds them, into about 1/4 x 1
strips. It's no louder than any home/office other
shredder I've used, though it is louder when shredding
CDs.
Jim
--- Travis H. [EMAIL PROTECTED]
calls to a prepaid phone. Think about who could manage
that.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/mobile/article/0,,1701298,00.html
http://www.globetechnology.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20060202.wcelltap0202/BNStory/International/
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
