Re: general defensive crypto coding principles

2006-02-13 Thread Peter Gutmann
Jack Lloyd <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >On Fri, Feb 10, 2006 at 07:21:05PM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote: >> Well, that's the exact problem that I pointed out in my previous message - in >> order to get this right, people have to read the mind of the paper author to >> divine their intent. Since the

Re: GnuTLS (libgrypt really) and Postfix

2006-02-13 Thread Simon Josefsson
Werner Koch <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > On Sat, 11 Feb 2006 12:36:52 +0100, Simon Josefsson said: > >> 1) It invoke exit, as you have noticed. While this only happen >> in extreme and fatal situations, and not during runtime, >> it is not that serious. Yet, I agree it is poor desig

Re: GnuTLS (libgrypt really) and Postfix

2006-02-13 Thread John Denker
David Wagner wrote: This just shows the dangers of over-generalization. One could make an even stronger statement about the dangers of making assumptions that are not provably correct. Of course, we have to decide which is more important: integrity, or availability. That is a false dicho

GnuTLS (libgrypt really) and Postfix

2006-02-13 Thread David Wagner
John Denker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >Werner Koch retorted: >> I disagree strongly here. Any code which detects an impossible state >> or an error clearly due to a programming error by the caller should >> die as soon as possible. > >That is a remarkably unprofessional suggestion. I hope the

Re: general defensive crypto coding principles

2006-02-13 Thread Ben Laurie
Paul Hoffman wrote: > At 5:40 PM + 2/12/06, Ben Laurie wrote: >> It also defends against the MD5 crack, and is one of the recommended >> IETF solutions to hash problems. > > s/recommended/proposed/ > > The IETF has not recommended any "solutions to hash problems". The sense > of the room at t