Re: GnuTLS (libgrypt really) and Postfix

2006-02-14 Thread Victor Duchovni
On Sun, Feb 12, 2006 at 04:45:33PM +, Ben Laurie wrote: Werner Koch wrote: On Sat, 11 Feb 2006 12:36:52 +0100, Simon Josefsson said: 1) It invoke exit, as you have noticed. While this only happen in extreme and fatal situations, and not during runtime, it is not that

Re: GnuTLS (libgrypt really) and Postfix

2006-02-14 Thread Victor Duchovni
On Mon, Feb 13, 2006 at 11:29:00AM +0100, Simon Josefsson wrote: However, looking at the code, it is possible for Postfix to handle this. They could have installed a log handler with libgcrypt, and make sure to shut down gracefully if the log level is FATAL. The recommendation to avoid

Re: general defensive crypto coding principles

2006-02-14 Thread Jack Lloyd
On Tue, Feb 14, 2006 at 03:24:09AM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote: 1. There are a great many special-case situations where no published protocol fits. As the author of a crypto toolkit, I could give you a list as long as your arm of user situations where no existing protocol can be applied

choosing building blocks, was Re: general defensive crypto coding principles

2006-02-14 Thread Travis H.
On 2/13/06, Peter Gutmann [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I would expect that typically implementors would be following a published standard, which would (well, one would hope) have had expert cryptographers check it over sometime prior to publication Published implementations aren't immune to

Re: GnuTLS (libgrypt really) and Postfix

2006-02-14 Thread Florian Weimer
* Werner Koch: On Sat, 11 Feb 2006 12:36:52 +0100, Simon Josefsson said: 1) It invoke exit, as you have noticed. While this only happen in extreme and fatal situations, and not during runtime, it is not that serious. Yet, I agree it is poor design to do this in a library.

Re: GnuTLS (libgrypt really) and Postfix

2006-02-14 Thread Werner Koch
On Sun, 12 Feb 2006 19:33:07 -0800 (PST), David Wagner said: Of course, it would be better for a crypto library to document this assumption explicitly than to leave it up to users to discover it the hard way, but I would not agree with the suggestion that this exit before Actually libgcrypt

Re: GnuTLS (libgrypt really) and Postfix

2006-02-14 Thread Werner Koch
On Sun, 12 Feb 2006 23:57:42 -, Dave Korn said: :-) Then what was EINVAL invented for? [ Then for what was assert invented for? ] Really it's never ok for anything, not even games, and any program that fails to check error return values is simply not properly coded, full stop. I

Re: GnuTLS (libgrypt really) and Postfix

2006-02-14 Thread Werner Koch
On Mon, 13 Feb 2006 11:29:00 +0100, Simon Josefsson said: That /dev/random doesn't exist seem like a quite possible state to me. Running Linux this is not possible because /dev/random is guarenteed to be available. Further, a library is not in a good position to report errors. A users will

Re: GnuTLS (libgrypt really) and Postfix

2006-02-14 Thread Werner Koch
On Mon, 13 Feb 2006 03:07:26 -0500, John Denker said: That might lead to an argument in favor of exceptions instead of error codes, along the following lines: -- Naive code doesn't catch the exception. However (unlike returned error codes) this does not cause the exception to be lost.

Re: GnuTLS (libgrypt really) and Postfix

2006-02-14 Thread leichter_jerrold
| I disagree strongly here. Any code which detects an impossible state | or an error clearly due to a programming error by the caller should | die as soon as possible. | | That is a remarkably unprofessional suggestion. I hope the people | who write software for autopilots, pacemakers,

HDCP support in PCs is nonexistent now?

2006-02-14 Thread John Gilmore
http://www.firingsquad.com/hardware/ati_nvidia_hdcp_support/ HDCP is Intel-designed copy prevention that uses strong crypto to encrypt the digital video signal on the cable between your video card (or TV or DVD player) and your monitor. There is no need for it -- you are seeing the signal that

Re: GnuTLS (libgrypt really) and Postfix

2006-02-14 Thread James A. Donald
-- Werner Koch retorted: I disagree strongly here. Any code which detects an impossible state or an error clearly due to a programming error by the caller should die as soon as possible. John Denker wrote: That is a remarkably unprofessional suggestion. I hope the people who

Re: GnuTLS (libgrypt really) and Postfix

2006-02-14 Thread James A. Donald
-- Libgcrypt tries to minimize these coding errors; for example there are no error returns for the RNG - if one calls for 16 bytes of random one can be sure that the buffer is filled with 16 bytes of random. Now, if the environment is not okay and Libgcrypt can't produce that random - what

RE: general defensive crypto coding principles

2006-02-14 Thread Anton Stiglic
I don't believe MtE is good advice, and I have yet to see a decent reason why one would want to use that instead of EtM. Of course when we talk about EtM, the MAC should be applied over all plaintext headers and trailers (including IV used for encryption, algorithm identifier, protocol version,

Re: GnuTLS (libgrypt really) and Postfix

2006-02-14 Thread Victor Duchovni
On Tue, Feb 14, 2006 at 12:44:39PM +1000, James A. Donald wrote: Absent exception handling, mission critical tasks should have no exceptions, which is best accomplished by the die-on-error standard. Absent good library design, the developer's goals are best accomplished with the

Re: GnuTLS (libgrypt really) and Postfix

2006-02-14 Thread Steven M. Bellovin
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], James A. Donald writes: -- Libgcrypt tries to minimize these coding errors; for example there are no error returns for the RNG - if one calls for 16 bytes of random one can be sure that the buffer is filled with 16 bytes of random. Now, if the environment