On Fri, 14 Jul 2006, Travis H. wrote:
Absent other protections, one could simply write a new WORM media with
falsified information.
I can see two ways of dealing with this:
1) Some kind of physical authenticity, such as signing one's name on
the media as they are produced (this assumes the
From: Travis H. [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Jul 14, 2006 11:22 PM
To: David Mercer [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Subject: Re: Interesting bit of a quote
...
The problem with this is determining if the media has been replaced.
Absent other protections, one could simply write a new
On 7/15/06, John Kelsey [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Another solution is to use cryptographic audit logs. Bruce Schneier
and I did some work on this several years ago, using a MAC to
authenticate the current record as it's written, and a one-way
function to derive the next key. (This idea was
Travis H. wrote:
1) Some kind of physical authenticity, such as signing one's name on
the media as they are produced (this assumes the signer is not
corruptible), or applying a frangible difficult-to-duplicate seal of
some kind (this assumes access controls on the seals).
2) Some kind of hash
