Jostein Tveit [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Anyone got a test key with a real and a forged signature to test
other implementations than OpenSSL?
There are actually two problems to consider...
First, there is the situation by Bleichenbacher at Crypto 06 and
explained in:
-Original Message-
From: Ben Laurie [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Samstag, 9. September 2006 22:39
To: Adam Back
Cc: Travis H.; Cryptography; Anton Stiglic
Subject: Re: IGE mode is broken (Re: IGE mode in OpenSSL)
[...]
In any case, I am not actually interested IGE itself,
Kuehn, Ulrich wrote:
-Original Message- From: Ben Laurie
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Samstag, 9. September 2006 22:39
To: Adam Back Cc: Travis H.; Cryptography; Anton Stiglic Subject:
Re: IGE mode is broken (Re: IGE mode in OpenSSL)
[...]
In any case, I am not actually
Kuehn, Ulrich wrote:
From: Ben Laurie [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Do I understand correctly? You do want that nobody is able to
authenticate a message, however, it shall not be intelligible if
manipulated with?
Correct. Minx (which is the only place I use IGE) avoids
traffic marking
On Mon, Sep 11, 2006 at 06:18:06AM +1000, James A. Donald wrote:
3. No one actually uses DNSSEC in the wild.
DNSSEC seems to be not-uncommonly used to secure dynamic updates,
which is not the most common DNS feature in the world but it is not
so uncommon either.
From: Sven Dietrich [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [fc-announce] CFP: Financial Cryptography 2007, Feb 12-15, 2007,
Tobago (submission
deadline Oct 9, 2006)
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Tue, 12 Sep 2006 17:11:33 -0400 (EDT)
Dear Colleague,
please find below the call for papers for Financial
