Ben Laurie wrote:
So, an executive summary of your responses appears to be "EKMI leaves
all the hard/impossible problems to be solved by components that are out
of scope".
A more optimistic way of putting this, Ben, is to state that EKMI allows
domain-experts of underlying components to addres
So, an executive summary of your responses appears to be "EKMI leaves
all the hard/impossible problems to be solved by components that are out
of scope".
As such, I'm not seeing much value.
Anyway...
Arshad Noor wrote:
Ben Laurie wrote:
OK, so you still have a PKI problem, in that you have t
On Thu, 31 Jul 2008, Pierre-Evariste Dagand wrote:
> Just by curiosity, I ran the Diehard tests[...]
>
> Sum-up for /dev/random:
> "Abnormally" high value: 0.993189 [1]
> "Abnormally" low value: 0.010507 [1]
> Total: 2
>
> Sum up for Sha1(n):
> "Abnormally" high values: 0.938376, 0.927501 [2]
> "Ab
William Allen Simpson wrote:
I've changed the subject. Some of my own rants are about mathematical
cryptographers that are looking for the "perfect" solution, instead of
practical security solution. Always think about the threat first!
In this threat environment, the attacker is unlikely to ha
Hi Ben,
http://www.cacert.at/cgi-bin/rngresults
Are you seriously saying that the entropy of FreeBSD /dev/random is 0?
Thanks for the notice, that was a broken upload by a user.
Best regards,
Philipp Gühring
-
The Cryptogr
Philipp Gühring wrote:
Hi,
I would suggest to use http://www.cacert.at/random/ to test the
randomness of the DNS source ports. Due to the large variety of
random-number sources that have been tested there already, it's useful
as a classification service of unknown randomly looking numbers.
Yo
