Re: [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?

That would be pretty neat, zero-knowledge TLS, then use the password exchange to mutually authenticate server and client while protecting against MITM. Pretty much any site could deploy that. -- Christian Huitema ___ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening

SA key of the organization. -- Christian Huitema ___ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

Re: [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?

ariant of DH that use the pairwise key to verify the integrity of the session keys, but that brings the public key technology back in the picture. Maybe I am just ignorant, but I don't know how to get PFS using just symmetric key algorithms. Does someone know better? - -- Christian Huitema

Re: [Cryptography] Der Spiegel: "NSA Can Spy on Smart Phone Data"

is non-existent. The high level summary is that phones contain a great deal of interesting information, that they can target IPhone and Android phone, and that after some pretty long efforts they can hack the Blackberry too. Bottom line, get a Windows Phone... - -- Christian Huitema -BEGIN P

Re: [Cryptography] Market demands for security (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN")

iruses, as a direct threat against continued sales of Windows products. And then he proceeded to direct the company to spend billions to improve the matter. Say what you want about BillG, but he is pretty good at assessing market demand. -- Christian Huitema __

Re: [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?

need to scale more than a "network of friends?" -- Christian Huitema ___ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

Re: [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?

algorithm. Of course, that means getting pair-wise shared secrets, and protecting them. Whether that’s harder or more fragile than maintaining a key ring is a matter of debate. It is probably more robust than relying on CA. - -- Christian Huitema -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2.0.20

Re: [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis

e that is very unlikely. Also, It would be very difficult to keep something like that secret for long, and the leak would have dire effects on the company's reputation. -- Christian Huitema ___ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

Re: [Cryptography] Why human-readable IDs (was Re: Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks)

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 This is exactly the problem that Kim Cameron and I tried to solve by developing what we called "call signs." The idea is to compress the hash of the public by solving a puzzle: find the arbitrary "salt" so that the hash of the salt and the public ke

Re: [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?

have to be published. But if you are looking at a P2P name server type application, there are very few such records. Basically, the less nodes rely on strangers, the better. - -- Christian Huitema -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2.0.20 (MingW32) Comment: Using gpg4

Re: [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks

the public key. - -- Christian Huitema -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2.0.20 (MingW32) Comment: Using gpg4o v3.1.107.3564 - http://www.gpg4o.de/ Charset: utf-8 iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJSHYUrAAoJELba05IUOHVQkb0H/ixGQK+kLx+SYp1FRJB5UF/Y lEfP8UGt+FVUweq3N0OWG7JB4HJzg14+tLbYjpkq6tJdJJPdoyDUVX9NgNvHR

Re: [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?

hard to guarantee that all queries will converge. But the network becomes much harder to penetrate. The old Freenet had a structure like that. -- Christian Huitema ___ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

Re: [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?

dentifier and the hash of a node identifier. All nodes are effectively relying on every other node. In an open network, that is pretty much equivalent to "relying on the goodness of strangers." You can be sure that if our buddies at the NSA set up to watch the content of a DHT

Re: [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks

servers. The obvious one is a communication application that beats traffic analysis by embedding its own "shuffling" or "onion routing." I don't think we can run anything like that directly on a phone, it would drain the b