Re: [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?

2013-09-09 Thread Jeffrey I. Schiller
believe you can do this without using some form of public key system. -Jeff – ___ Jeffrey I. Schiller Information Services and Technology Massachusetts Institute of Technology 77 Massachusetts Avenue Room E17

Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on BULLRUN

2013-09-08 Thread Jeffrey I. Schiller
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On Fri, Sep 06, 2013 at 05:22:26PM -0700, John Gilmore wrote: Speaking as someone who followed the IPSEC IETF standards committee pretty closely, while leading a group that tried to implement it and make so usable that it would be used by default

Re: [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?

2013-09-07 Thread Jeffrey I. Schiller
entropy to use it for encryption or for signatures. - -Jeff ___ Jeffrey I. Schiller Information Services and Technology Massachusetts Institute of Technology 77 Massachusetts Avenue Room E17-110A, 32-392 Cambridge, MA 02139-4307

[Cryptography] Protecting Private Keys

2013-09-07 Thread Jeffrey I. Schiller
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 While we worry about symmetric vs. public key ciphers, we should not forget the risk of compromise of our long-term keys. How are they protected? One of the most obvious ways to compromise a cryptographic system is to get the keys. This is a

Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on BULLRUN

2013-09-07 Thread Jeffrey I. Schiller
___ Jeffrey I. Schiller Information Services and Technology Massachusetts Institute of Technology 77 Massachusetts Avenue Room E17-110A, 32-392 Cambridge, MA 02139-4307 617.910.0259 - Voice j...@mit.edu http://jis.qyv.name

[Cryptography] Google's Public Key Size (was Re: NSA and cryptanalysis)

2013-09-02 Thread Jeffrey I. Schiller
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On Mon, Sep 02, 2013 at 03:09:31PM -0400, Jerry Leichter wrote: Google recently switched to 2048 bit keys; hardly any other sites have done so, and some older software even has trouble talking to Google as a result. Btw. As a random side-note.

Re: HSM outage causes root CA key loss

2009-07-14 Thread Jeffrey I. Schiller
that when the only copy of your key is in an HSM, the HSM vendor really owns you key, or at least they own you! -- Jeffrey I. Schiller MIT Network Manager Information Services and Technology Massachusetts Institute of Technology 77

Disk Encryption (was: Re: PGP master keys)

2006-05-01 Thread Jeffrey I. Schiller
. -- = Jeffrey I. Schiller MIT Network Manager Information Services and Technology Massachusetts Institute of Technology 77 Massachusetts Avenue Room W92-190 Cambridge, MA 02139-4307 617.253.0161 - Voice [EMAIL PROTECTED