From: R. A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Sep 20, 2004 8:33 AM
Subject: Academics locked out by tight visa controls
http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/9710963.htm?template=contentModules/printstory.jsp
Posted on Mon, Sep. 20, 2004
Academics locked out by tight visa controls
U.S.
.)
Bear
--John Kelsey
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From: Ivan Krstic [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Aug 29, 2004 8:40 AM
To: Metzdowd Crypto [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: ?splints for broken hash functions
This is Schneier's and Ferguson's solution to then-known hash function
weaknesses in Practical Cryptography, Wiley Publishing, 2003:
We do not
explanation in
the Wang, et. al. paper, which hasn't been released yet.
--John Kelsey
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--John Kelsey
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From: lrk [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Aug 6, 2004 1:04 PM
To: R. A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Cryptography and the Open Source Security Debate
...
More dangerous is a key generator which deliberately produces keys which
are easy to factor by someone knowing
From: bear [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Jun 22, 2004 3:46 PM
Bob and Alice routinely discuss bombs, terrorism, tax cheating, sexual
infidelity, and deviant sex over the internet. They conspire to commit
crimes, share banned texts and suppressed news, or topple tyrannical
governments whose
leave it unchanged.
Peter Trei
--John Kelsey, [EMAIL PROTECTED], who is definitely speaking only for
himself.
PGP: FA48 3237 9AD5 30AC EEDD BBC8 2A80 6948 4CAA F259
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agency. :-)
Surely a better government-related TLA for this would be derived from
Non-changeability, Secrecy, and Authentication :)
Richard
--John Kelsey, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
PGP: FA48 3237 9AD5 30AC EEDD BBC8 2A80 6948 4CAA F259
but a hash function, and for all the
variants of the Merkle puzzle schemes I can think of. (Which are public
key, but just barely.)
...
-- Jerry
--John Kelsey, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
PGP: FA48 3237 9AD5 30AC EEDD BBC8 2A80 6948 4CAA F259
is whether those equation-solving
attacks can really be used against AES, and there doesn't seem to be anyone
who's completely confident of the answer to that question.
...
Bear
--John Kelsey, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
PGP: FA48 3237 9AD5 30AC EEDD BBC8 2A80 6948 4CAA F259
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