Greg Black wrote:
On 2008-06-02, Adam Aviv wrote:
I recently implemented SSARES directly in python and also added
parallelism to the searching. We can now search the a large inbox
(1000+) messages in about 2-4 minutes.
Not to rain on your parade, but 1,000 messages is *not* a large inbox
and
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
In a video, Christopher Tarnovsky, shows a physical attack on a smart card:
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/05/hacker-at-cente.html
I couldn't tell from the video how long it takes but it doesn't appear
to take more than an hour or so.
I had written up some
On Sun, May 18, 2008 at 4:55 PM, Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
A simple trick can be used to help immunize DSA signatures against
these kinds of failures. I first learned of this idea many years ago
from Phil Zimmermann, and a varient has been used for a long time in
PGP and probably
Ilya Levin wrote:
I'm not affiliated with Elcomsoft and don't know their real
intentions, but what they are trying to do is perfectly reasonable.
Once they release a commercial product with such feature it is only a
matter of time until Microsoft or some other patent troll will run for
a
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Mon, May 21, 2007 at 04:32:10PM -0400, Victor Duchovni wrote:
On Mon, May 21, 2007 at 02:44:28PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
My take: clearly, 1024 bits is no longer sufficient for RSA use for
high value applications, though this has been on the horizon for some
-forgery-explained-with-nate-lawson-part-vi/
The author of the Mu article does not list all the verification steps
needed, and even seems to infer that the values g and p are negotiated
between the two parties. This would be a bad idea, versus choosing a
set of values that were pre-verified.
This type
