What does it say about the integrity of the FIPS program, and its
CMTL evaluation process, when it is left to competitors to point out
non-compliance of evaluated products -- proprietary or open source --
to basic architectural requirements of the standard?
_Vin
===
I apologize for misstating your name, Mr. Simon.
I thought I had answered your question. No one asked me to reply to
Ruptor, or to you -- and you chose the tone of this exchange. As I
said, I would be shocked if anyone at RSA or EMC even knows about
this discussion.
No one tells me what to
obably using the wrong terms.
Do you have
> >references for this that I could have a look at?
Vin McLellan (me) responded:
> I'd also be interested in any evidence that the SecurID has been cracked.
>
> Any credible report would have the immediate attention of tens of
> thousands of
At 12:40 PM 9/2/2007, Paul Walker wrote:
I didn't realise the current SecurID tokens had been broken. A quick Google
doesn't show anything, but I'm probably using the wrong terms. Do you have
references for this that I could have a look at?
I'd also be interested in any evidence that the Secur
On Cryptography, and in several other online forums, Hadmut Danisch
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, a respected German information security analyst,
recently published a harsh critique of one optional feature in the
SID800, one of the newest of the six SecurID authentication tokens --
some with slightly
Boston Globe reporter Gareth Cook <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> was awarded the
2005 Pulitzer Prize for Explanatory Journalism for "explaining, with
clarity and humanity, the complex scientific and ethical dimensions
of stem cell research." He's an unusually talented writer.
_Vin
---
Pithy wit and wisdom from New Zealand. lol.
_Vin
-Original Message-
From: Peter Gutmann <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Thursday, 23 March 2006 12:41 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: RE: [Cfrg] Defining inter operable ECC keys in for IETF protocols
"Blumenthal, Uri" <[EMA
Every once in a while really smart people say really stupid things.
The gratuitous allegations, in one tiny section of this otherwise slick and
fascinating paper, that the author of the Witty worm was a "ISS insider" is
an example of this.
The idea was that only an "insider" could have known,
256 key lengths.
-------
Vin McLellan + The Privacy Guild + <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
22 Beacon St., Chelsea, MA 02150-2672 USA
-
The Cryptography Mailing List
U
At 05:04 PM 9/8/03 , Trei, Peter wrote:
Why the heck would a government agency have to break the GSM encryption at
all? The encryption is only on the airlink, and all GSM calls travel
through the POTS land line system in the clear, where they are subject to
warranted wiretaps.
A government agen
Personal
(Use it if you'd like, but keep me out of it.)
Steve Bellovin wrote:
Slightly off-topic, but a reminder of the sort of thing that ordinary
crypto doesn't hide.
http://www.silicon.com/news/59-51/1/5093.html?rolling=2
IT Myths: Colombian drugs gang's mainframe-assisted assassinatio
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