Re: GSM eavesdropping

2010-08-04 Thread Jerry Leichter
On Aug 2, 2010, at 4:19 PM, Paul Wouters wrote: ...Of course, TLS hasn't been successful in the sense that we care about most. TLS has had no impact on how users authenticate (we still send usernames and passwords) to servers, and the way TLS authenticates servers to users turns out to be very

Re: GSM eavesdropping

2010-08-03 Thread Perry E. Metzger
On Tue, 3 Aug 2010 17:49:00 +0200 Eugen Leitl wrote: > Encryption is cheap enough (especially if you cache keys from > previous sessions). Why not encrypt everything? I'm not sure it is actually cheap enough in all cases. Imagine the state explosion problem that DNS root servers would face, for e

Re: GSM eavesdropping

2010-08-03 Thread Eugen Leitl
On Mon, Aug 02, 2010 at 03:46:24PM -0500, Nicolas Williams wrote: > > "The default mode for any internet communication is encrypted" > > That's... extreme. There are many things that will not be encrypted, Extreme? I don't see why my ISP should be able to inspect and monetize my data stream. >

Re: GSM eavesdropping

2010-08-03 Thread Jerry Leichter
On Aug 2, 2010, at 1:25 PM, Nicolas Williams wrote: On Mon, Aug 02, 2010 at 12:32:23PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: Looking forward, the "there should be one mode, and it should be secure" philosophy would claim that there should be no insecure mode for a protocol. Of course, virtually all pr

Re: GSM eavesdropping

2010-08-03 Thread Perry E. Metzger
On Mon, 2 Aug 2010 16:19:38 -0400 (EDT) Paul Wouters wrote: > [Speaking here about DNSSEC...] > Yes, but in some the API is pretty much done. If you trust your > (local) resolver, the one bit is the only thing you need to check. > You let the resolver do most of the bootstrap crypto. One you have

Re: GSM eavesdropping

2010-08-03 Thread Nicolas Williams
On Mon, Aug 02, 2010 at 04:19:38PM -0400, Paul Wouters wrote: > On Mon, 2 Aug 2010, Nicolas Williams wrote: > >How should we measure success? > > "The default mode for any internet communication is encrypted" That's... extreme. There are many things that will not be encrypted, starting with the

Re: GSM eavesdropping

2010-08-03 Thread Paul Wouters
On Mon, 2 Aug 2010, Nicolas Williams wrote: If that was a major issue, then SSL would have been much more successful then it has been. How should we measure success? "The default mode for any internet communication is encrypted" By that measure TLS has been so much more successful than IPs

Re: GSM eavesdropping

2010-08-02 Thread Nicolas Williams
On Mon, Aug 02, 2010 at 01:05:53PM -0400, Paul Wouters wrote: > On Mon, 2 Aug 2010, Perry E. Metzger wrote: > > >For example, in the internet space, we have http, smtp, imap and other > >protocols in both plain and ssl flavors. (IPSec was originally > >intended to mitigate this by providing a comm

Re: GSM eavesdropping

2010-08-02 Thread Nicolas Williams
On Mon, Aug 02, 2010 at 12:32:23PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: > Looking forward, the "there should be one mode, and it should be > secure" philosophy would claim that there should be no insecure > mode for a protocol. Of course, virtually all protocols we use right > now had their origins in th

Re: GSM eavesdropping

2010-08-02 Thread Perry E. Metzger
On Mon, 2 Aug 2010 12:45:46 -0400 John Kemp wrote: > On Aug 2, 2010, at 11:08 AM, Perry E. Metzger wrote: > > > On Mon, 2 Aug 2010 11:02:54 -0400 Bill Squier > > wrote: > >> "...In his presentation at the Black Hat Conference, German GSM > >> expert Karsten Nohl presented a tool he calls Kraken,

Re: GSM eavesdropping

2010-08-02 Thread Paul Wouters
On Mon, 2 Aug 2010, Perry E. Metzger wrote: For example, in the internet space, we have http, smtp, imap and other protocols in both plain and ssl flavors. (IPSec was originally intended to mitigate this by providing a common security layer for everything, but it failed, for many reasons. Nico m

Re: GSM eavesdropping

2010-08-02 Thread John Kemp
On Aug 2, 2010, at 11:08 AM, Perry E. Metzger wrote: > On Mon, 2 Aug 2010 11:02:54 -0400 Bill Squier > wrote: >> "...In his presentation at the Black Hat Conference, German GSM >> expert Karsten Nohl presented a tool he calls Kraken, which he >> claims can crack the A5/1 encryption used for cell

Re: GSM eavesdropping

2010-08-02 Thread Perry E. Metzger
On Mon, 2 Aug 2010 12:12:25 -0400 Adam Fields wrote: > > Apropos the theses thread, this article contains mention of an > interesting security "feature": > > 'Although the GSM specifications say that a phone should pop up a > warning when it connects to a station that does not have encryption, >

Re: GSM eavesdropping

2010-08-02 Thread Adam Fields
On Mon, Aug 02, 2010 at 04:55:04PM +0100, Adrian Hayter wrote: > In a related story, hacker Chris Paget created his own cell-phone base > station that turned off encryption on all devices connecting to it. The > station then routes the calls through VoIP. > > http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/201

Re: GSM eavesdropping

2010-08-02 Thread Adrian Hayter
In a related story, hacker Chris Paget created his own cell-phone base station that turned off encryption on all devices connecting to it. The station then routes the calls through VoIP. http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/07/intercepting-cell-phone-calls/ -Adrian On 2 Aug 2010, at 16:02, Bi

Re: GSM eavesdropping

2010-08-02 Thread Frank A. Stevenson
On Mon, 2010-08-02 at 11:02 -0400, Bill Squier wrote: > "...In his presentation at the Black Hat Conference, German GSM expert > Karsten Nohl presented a tool he calls Kraken, which he claims can crack the > A5/1 encryption used for cell phone calls within seconds." > > http://www.h-online.com/s

Re: GSM eavesdropping

2010-08-02 Thread Perry E. Metzger
On Mon, 2 Aug 2010 11:02:54 -0400 Bill Squier wrote: > "...In his presentation at the Black Hat Conference, German GSM > expert Karsten Nohl presented a tool he calls Kraken, which he > claims can crack the A5/1 encryption used for cell phone calls > within seconds." > > http://www.h-online.com/se

GSM eavesdropping

2010-08-02 Thread Bill Squier
"...In his presentation at the Black Hat Conference, German GSM expert Karsten Nohl presented a tool he calls Kraken, which he claims can crack the A5/1 encryption used for cell phone calls within seconds." http://www.h-online.com/security/news/item/Quickly-decrypting-cell-phone-calls-1048850.ht