Re: Pseudonymity for tor: nym-0.1 (fwd)

2005-10-07 Thread lists
From: Bill Frantz [EMAIL PROTECTED] system, for example, recognition of the number on an image. In fact, This solution is subject to a rather interesting attack, which to my knowledge has not yet been named, although it is occasionally used Stealing Cycles from Humans is the name I know for

Re: Pseudonymity for tor: nym-0.1 (fwd)

2005-10-06 Thread Alexander Klimov
On Sun, 2 Oct 2005, Matt Crawford wrote: On Sep 29, 2005, at 18:32, Jason Holt wrote: Of course, you can put anything you want in the cert, since the servers know that my CA only certifies 1 bit of data about users (namely, that they only get one cert per scarce resource). One per person

Re: Pseudonymity for tor: nym-0.1 (fwd)

2005-10-02 Thread Matt Crawford
On Sep 29, 2005, at 18:32, Jason Holt wrote: Of course, you can put anything you want in the cert, since the servers know that my CA only certifies 1 bit of data about users (namely, that they only get one cert per scarce resource). One per person is a tough thing to do purely over the

Re: Pseudonymity for tor: nym-0.1 (fwd)

2005-09-29 Thread Jason Holt
On Thu, 29 Sep 2005, Ian G wrote: Couple of points of clarification - you mean here CA as certificate authority? Normally I've seen Mint as the term of art for the center in a blinded token issuing system, and I'm wondering what the relationship here is ... is this something in the 1990 paper?

Pseudonymity for tor: nym-0.1 (fwd)

2005-09-28 Thread Jason Holt
-- Forwarded message -- Date: Thu, 29 Sep 2005 01:49:26 + (UTC) From: Jason Holt [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Pseudonymity for tor: nym-0.1 Per the recent discussion regarding tor and wikipedia, I've hacked together an implementation of the basic