On 3/17/06, Weger, B.M.M. de [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
You might be interested in knowing that my MSc student
Marc Stevens has found a considerable speedup of MD5
collision generation. His improvements of Wang's method
enables one to make MD5 collisions typically in one
minute on a PC;
In the light of day and less inebriated, I'd like to clarify some of what I
wrote last night, and maybe expand a bit. My original account wasn't what
I'd like to think of as a record for posterity.
Greg.
At 13:11 2004-08-18 +1000, Greg Rose wrote:
Xiaoyun Wang was almost unintelligible.
This
At 00:49 2004-08-19 +1000, Greg Rose wrote:
There has been criticism about the Wang et. al paper that it doesn't
explain how they get the collisions. That isn't right. Note that from the
incorrect paper to the corrected one, the delta values didn't change.
Basically, if you throw random numbers
At 12:04 2004-08-18 -0400, Whyte, William wrote:
There has been criticism about the Wang et. al paper that it doesn't
explain how they get the collisions. That isn't right. Note that from the
incorrect paper to the corrected one, the delta values didn't change.
Basically, if you throw random
On Thu, 19 Aug 2004 00:49:17 +1000, Greg Rose [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
It seems to be a straightforward differential cryptanalysis attack, so
one wonders why no-one else came up with it.
With further hindsight, and Phil Hawkes' help, I understand now. The
technique needs to alternate
Eric Rescorla wrote:
Check out this ePrint paper, which claims to have collisions in
MD5, MD4, HAVAL, and full RIPEMD.
http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/199.pdf
The authors claim that the MD5 attack took an hour for the first
collision and 15 seconds to 5 minutes for subsequent attacks
with the same
At 14:12 2004-08-17 -0300, Mads Rasmussen wrote:
Eric Rescorla wrote:
Check out this ePrint paper, which claims to have collisions in
MD5, MD4, HAVAL, and full RIPEMD.
http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/199.pdf
The authors claim that the MD5 attack took an hour for the first
collision and 15 seconds to 5
