Mr Pink writes:
In Applied Crypto, the use of padding for CBC encryption is suggested
to be met by ending the data block with a 1 and then all 0s to the end
of the block size.
Is this not introducing a risk as you are essentially introducing a
large amount of guessable plaintext into the
We had many discussions about this 15 years ago
You usually have predictable plaintext. A cipher that isn't strong enough
against a chosen/known plaintext attack has too many other protocol
problems to worry about mere padding!
For IPsec, we originally specified random padding with 1
Hi,
This may be out of the remit of the list, if so a pointer to a more
appropriate forum would be welcome.
In Applied Crypto, the use of padding for CBC encryption is suggested
to be met by ending the data block with a 1 and then all 0s to the end
of the block size.
Is this not introducing a
| Hi,
|
| This may be out of the remit of the list, if so a pointer to a more
| appropriate forum would be welcome.
|
| In Applied Crypto, the use of padding for CBC encryption is suggested
| to be met by ending the data block with a 1 and then all 0s to the end
| of the block size.
|
| Is this
On Fri, 7 Mar 2008 15:04:49 +0100
COMINT [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hi,
This may be out of the remit of the list, if so a pointer to a more
appropriate forum would be welcome.
In Applied Crypto, the use of padding for CBC encryption is suggested
to be met by ending the data block with a 1
