On Fri, May 8, 2009 at 10:28 AM, Brandon Enright bmenr...@ucsd.edu wrote:
Steven M. Bellovin s...@cs.columbia.edu wrote:
On Thu, 30 Apr 2009 17:44:53 -0700
Jon Callas j...@callas.org wrote:
The accepted wisdom
on 80-bit security (which includes SHA-1, 1024-bit RSA and DSA keys,
and
On Wed, 6 May 2009 20:54:34 -0400
Steven M. Bellovin s...@cs.columbia.edu wrote:
On Thu, 30 Apr 2009 17:44:53 -0700
Jon Callas j...@callas.org wrote:
The accepted wisdom
on 80-bit security (which includes SHA-1, 1024-bit RSA and DSA keys,
and other things) is that it is to be retired by
At 8:54 PM -0400 5/6/09, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
On Thu, 30 Apr 2009 17:44:53 -0700
Jon Callas j...@callas.org wrote:
The accepted wisdom
on 80-bit security (which includes SHA-1, 1024-bit RSA and DSA keys,
and other things) is that it is to be retired by the end of 2010.
That's an
On Thu, 30 Apr 2009 17:44:53 -0700
Jon Callas j...@callas.org wrote:
The accepted wisdom
on 80-bit security (which includes SHA-1, 1024-bit RSA and DSA keys,
and other things) is that it is to be retired by the end of 2010.
That's an interesting statement from a historical perspective -- is
Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.com writes:
Home routers and other equipment last for years. If we slowly roll out
various protocol and system updates now, then in a number of years, when we
find ourselves with real trouble, a lot of them will already be updated
because new ones won't have
Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.com writes:
Greg Rose g...@qualcomm.com writes:
It already wasn't theoretical... if you know what I mean. The writing
has been on the wall since Wang's attacks four years ago.
Sure, but this should light a fire under people for things like TLS 1.2.
Why?
Peter Gutmann pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz writes:
Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.com writes:
Greg Rose g...@qualcomm.com writes:
It already wasn't theoretical... if you know what I mean. The writing
has been on the wall since Wang's attacks four years ago.
Sure, but this should light a fire
At Sat, 02 May 2009 21:53:40 +1200,
Peter Gutmann wrote:
Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.com writes:
Greg Rose g...@qualcomm.com writes:
It already wasn't theoretical... if you know what I mean. The writing
has been on the wall since Wang's attacks four years ago.
Sure, but this should
On May 2, 2009, at 5:53, Peter Gutmann wrote:
Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.com writes:
Greg Rose g...@qualcomm.com writes:
It already wasn't theoretical... if you know what I mean. The
writing
has been on the wall since Wang's attacks four years ago.
Sure, but this should light a fire
At Sat, 2 May 2009 15:00:36 -0400,
Matt Blaze wrote:
The serious concern here seems to me not to be that this particular
weakness is a last straw wedge that enables some practical attack
against some particular protocol -- maybe it is and maybe it isn't.
What worries me is that SHA-1 has been
On Thu, Apr 30, 2009 at 11:07:31PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Greg Rose g...@qualcomm.com writes:
This is a very important result. The need to transition from SHA-1
is no longer theoretical.
It already wasn't theoretical... if you know what I mean. The writing
has been on the
McDonald, Hawkes and Pieprzyk claim that they have reduced the collision
strength of SHA-1 to 2^{52}.
Slides here:
http://eurocrypt2009rump.cr.yp.to/837a0a8086fa6ca714249409ddfae43d.pdf
Thanks to Paul Hoffman for pointing me to this.
-Ekr
Eric Rescorla e...@networkresonance.com writes:
McDonald, Hawkes and Pieprzyk claim that they have reduced the collision
strength of SHA-1 to 2^{52}.
Slides here:
http://eurocrypt2009rump.cr.yp.to/837a0a8086fa6ca714249409ddfae43d.pdf
Thanks to Paul Hoffman for pointing me to this.
This is
On 2009 Apr 30, at 4:31 , Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Eric Rescorla e...@networkresonance.com writes:
McDonald, Hawkes and Pieprzyk claim that they have reduced the
collision
strength of SHA-1 to 2^{52}.
Slides here:
http://eurocrypt2009rump.cr.yp.to/
837a0a8086fa6ca714249409ddfae43d.pdf
On Apr 30, 2009, at 4:31 PM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Eric Rescorla e...@networkresonance.com writes:
McDonald, Hawkes and Pieprzyk claim that they have reduced the
collision
strength of SHA-1 to 2^{52}.
Slides here:
http://eurocrypt2009rump.cr.yp.to/
837a0a8086fa6ca714249409ddfae43d.pdf
Greg Rose g...@qualcomm.com writes:
This is a very important result. The need to transition from SHA-1
is no longer theoretical.
It already wasn't theoretical... if you know what I mean. The writing
has been on the wall since Wang's attacks four years ago.
Sure, but this should light a fire
16 matches
Mail list logo
