Ed Gerck wrote:
From your URLs:
The browser verifies that the fingerprint in the URL matches the public key
provided by the visited site. Certificates and Certificate Authorities are
unnecessary.
Spoofing? Man-in-the-middle? Revocation?
Also, in general, we find that one reference
Tyler should probably reference SFS on his HTTPSY pages. Here's a good paper
focussed specifically on this issue.
http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/mazieres99separating.html
Although I haven't looked closely at HTTPSY yet, I'm pretty sure that it
simply applies to the Web the same notion that SFS
Zooko [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Although I haven't looked closely at HTTPSY yet, I'm pretty sure that it
simply applies to the Web the same notion that SFS applies to remote
filesystems.
It is an excellent idea.
SFS makes it practically impossible to do key updates, and the trust
model
At 12:30 AM 7/15/03 -0400, Don Davis wrote:
An electrical engineer at Washington University
in St. Louis has devised a theory that sets the
limits for the amount of data that can be hidden
in a system and then provides guidelines for how
to store data and decode it. Contrarily, the
theory
Ben Laurie wrote:
Ed Gerck wrote:
Also, in general, we find that one reference is not enough to induce trust.
Self-references
cannot induce trust, either (Trust me!). Thus, it is misleading to let the
introducer
determine the message target, in what you call the y-property. Spoofing
