=Step 1:
Exchange ID messages. An ID message contains the name of the tinc
daemon which sends it, the protocol version it uses, and various
options (like which cipher and digest algorithm it wants to use).
By name of the tinc daemon, do you mean identification information?
That data
I wrote:
For some recent relevant papers, see the ACM-CCS '02 paper my colleagues
and I wrote on our JFK protocol (http://www.crypto.com/papers/jfk-ccs.ppt),
...
But of course I meant the url to be
http://www.crypto.com/papers/jfk-ccs.pdf
I don't know what I could have been thinking; I
If we use RSA encryption, then both sides know their message can only
be received by the intended recipient. If we use RSA signing, then we
both sides know the message they receive can only come from the assumed
sender. For the purpose of tinc's authentication protocol, I don't see
the
Guus Sliepen [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
On Mon, Sep 29, 2003 at 09:35:56AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
Was there any technical reason why the existing cryptographic
skeletons wouldn't have been just as good?
Well all existing authentication schemes do what they are supposed do,
that's
Bill Stewart [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
If we use RSA encryption, then both sides know their message can only
be received by the intended recipient. If we use RSA signing, then we
both sides know the message they receive can only come from the assumed
sender. For the purpose of tinc's
Matt Blaze:
It is probably no longer acceptable, as it was just a few years ago,
to throw together an ad-hoc authentication or key agreement protocol
based on informal obvious security properties, without a strong
proof of security and a clear statement of the model under which the
I'm not an expert on this stuff, but I'm interested enough to chase
a few references...
Ivan Krstic [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
The idea that observing modifies state is something to be approached with
caution. Read-only does make sense in quantum world; implementations of
early theoretical
http://usatoday.printthis.clickability.com/pt/cpt?action=cptexpire=urlID=7729492fb=YpartnerID=1663
USA Today
Stephenson recycles cryptic 'Quicksilver'
By Elizabeth Wiese, USA TODAY
Quicksilver is the first book in author Neal Stephenson's Baroque Cycle trilogy and a
tangential prequel to
On Mon, Sep 29, 2003 at 11:54:20AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
Well all existing authentication schemes do what they are supposed do,
that's not the problem. We just want one that is as simple as possible
(so we can understand it better and implement it more easily), and which
is
On Mon, Sep 29, 2003 at 09:51:20AM -0700, Bill Stewart wrote:
=Step 1:
Exchange ID messages. An ID message contains the name of the tinc
daemon which sends it, the protocol version it uses, and various
options (like which cipher and digest algorithm it wants to use).
By name of
And what stops an attacker from taking that digital video, stripping off
the RSA(?) signatures (I'll assume it's just signed), editing it, creating
another, random, one time private key, destroying that private key after
resigning it, and offering it up as unedited?!?!?!?!
They've either
http://craphound.com/cringely_toorcon_2003.txt
Robert Cringely's Keynote:
I Have Seen the Future and We Are It: The Past, Present and
Future of Information Security
From ToorCon 2003, www.toorcon.org
San Diego, CA
Impressionistic transcript by Cory Doctorow
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sept 27, 2003
I imagine the Plumbers Electricians Union must have used similar
arguments to enclose the business to themselves, and keep out unlicensed
newcomers. No longer acceptable indeed. Too much competition boys?
Rich,
Oh come on. Are you willfully misinterpreting what I wrote, or
did you
Richard Schroeppel [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
(Responding to the chorus of protocol professionals saying please do
not roll your own)
I imagine the Plumbers Electricians Union must have used similar
arguments to enclose the business to themselves, and keep out unlicensed
newcomers. No longer
Perry writes:
Richard Schroeppel [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
(Responding to the chorus of protocol professionals saying please do
not roll your own)
I imagine the Plumbers Electricians Union must have used similar
arguments to enclose the business to themselves, and keep out unlicensed
Hi all,
Does anybody on this list know literature about cryptographic hash
tries? (I hit on this idea when mulling about a different problem, and
was wondering what people have written about it.) I.e., a data structure
for keeping sets of pieces of data, by:
- computing a cryptographic hash
Of course, if it's is just signed-frame video, prior art doesn't begin to describe
this.
Cheers,
RAH
--
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2003/09/030929054614.htm
Science Daily
Source :
Johns Hopkins University
Date :
2003-09-29
Johns Hopkins APL Creates System To Detect
Guus Sliepen [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
On Mon, Sep 29, 2003 at 02:07:04PM +0200, Guus Sliepen wrote:
Step 2:
Exchange METAKEY messages. The METAKEY message contains the public part
of a key used in a Diffie-Hellman key exchange. This message is
encrypted using RSA with OAEP padding,
I imagine the Plumbers Electricians Union must have used similar
arguments to enclose the business to themselves, and keep out unlicensed
newcomers. No longer acceptable indeed. Too much competition boys?
The world might be better off if you couldn't call something
secure unless it came
At 01:14 AM 10/1/2003 +0300, Benja Fallenstein wrote:
So, anyway, anybody know references? I've not come across any yet.
I know that the technique dates back (at least) to IBM in the 60s. I used
to know the name of the inventor but can't bring it to mind at the moment.
The Berkeley UNIX library
Hi Greg--
Greg Rose wrote:
At 01:14 AM 10/1/2003 +0300, Benja Fallenstein wrote:
So, anyway, anybody know references? I've not come across any yet.
I know that the technique dates back (at least) to IBM in the 60s.
Cool-- but--
On second thoughts, do you mean *cryptographic* hash tries or hash
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