RE: Protection against offline dictionary attack on static files

Jill's approach to key stretching is not quite the same as the traditional iterated hash. It imposes no cost at encryption time, you only have to work at decryption. This might be valuable when you want to save your files as the Gestapo is breaking down your door. I've been working on a

Fwd: New PGP Universal beta: PGP and S/MIME

fyi - Forwarded message from Lucky Green [EMAIL PROTECTED] - Cpunks, I spent the last few months working at PGP on a nifty new solution to an old problem: how to get email encryption deployed more widely without requiring user education. Since ideas for solving this problem have been

Re: Protection against offline dictionary attack on static files

Arcane Jill wrote: ... a way to make decryption more expensive ... I think it is a neat idea. I think it is best understood as a kind of key-stretching akin to iterated hashing of a password, as in: Secure Applications of Low-Entropy Keys (1998) John Kelsey, Bruce Schneier, Chris Hall,

A-B-a-b encryption

it came up lately in a discussion, and I couldn't put a name to it: a means to use symmetric crypto without exchanging keys: - Alice encrypts M with key A and sends it to Bob - Bob encrypts A(M) with key B and sends it to Alice - Alice decrypts B(A(M)) with key A, leaving B(M), sends it to

XML-proof UIDs

Does anyone have robust code to generate globally unique IDs which won't break XML parsing, and work on several platforms? I was thinking of using an entropy pool to seed a cryptographic PRNG, used to generate a sequence of SHA-1 hashes, dumped to an XML-armored representation. Thanks. --

Re: Are there...

Enzo Michelangeli wrote: ...one-way encryption algorithms guaranteed to be injective (i.e., deterministically collision-free)? Every encryption algorithm is injective, otherwise decryption would be ambiguous. In other words, if x and x' are two different plaintexts, then E_k(x) != E_k(x'). I'm

Re: 'Smart stamps' next in war on terrorism

The postal notice itself says this is the first step to identify all senders, so this is not a matter of paranoia, this is reality. The post office is moving towards identification requirements for everyone, said Chris Hoofnagle, associate director of the Electronic Privacy Information

Re: Clipper for luggage

Bill Frantz [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: I usually travel with zipper closed duffel bags. I fasten the zipper closed with a screw link. Anyone can unscrew the link and get into the bag, but it does effectively keep the zipper closed in transit. I suppose it also provides some level of security

RE: Are there...one-way encryption algorithms

Enzo asked, Are there one-way encryption algorithms guaranteed to be injective (i.e., deterministically collision-free)? Or are there theoretical reasons against their existence? I'm looking for algorithms where every piece of code and data is public, thus excluding conventional

Re: XML-proof UIDs

At 05:52 AM 11/14/2003, Eugen Leitl wrote: Does anyone have robust code to generate globally unique IDs which won't break XML parsing, and work on several platforms? I was thinking of using an entropy pool to seed a cryptographic PRNG, used to generate a sequence of SHA-1 hashes, dumped to an