From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2003 12:29 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [NEC] #2.12: The RIAA Succeeds Where the CypherPunks Failed
NEC @ Shirky.com, a mailing list about Networks, Economics, and Culture
Published periodically / #2.12 / December 17, 2003
At 16:36 17/12/2003, Matt wrote:
Ben, Amir, et.al.
I see that cipher1 has no transparent value. Therefore, the XML-Encrypted
message see ( http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/ ) must transport
(1) symmetric_IV
(2) Sign_RSA_Receiver_PK(symmetric_Key)
(3) cipher
(4) Sign_RSA_Sender(SHA1(message))
This
*
DIMACS/PORTIA Workshop on Privacy-Preserving Data Mining
March 15 - 16, 2004
DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ
Organizers:
Cynthia Dwork, Microsoft, dwork at microsoft.com
Benny Pinkas, HP
| > | means that some entity is supposed to "trust" the kernel (what
| > | else?). If two entities, who do not completely trust each other, are
| > | supposed to both "trust" such a kernel, something very very fishy is
| > | going on.
| >
| > Why? If I'm going to use a time-shared machine, I have
Ben, Amir, et.al.
I see that cipher1 has no transparent value. Therefore, the XML-Encrypted
message see ( http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/ ) must transport
(1) symmetric_IV
(2) Sign_RSA_Receiver_PK(symmetric_Key)
(3) cipher
(4) Sign_RSA_Sender(SHA1(message))
This is clearly more concise. If t
Matt, in your note below you explained finally what you really want: a
secure combination of encryption and signature. I explain below why your
current scheme is insecure. There are simple secure designs. With Yitchak
Gertner, a student, we recently proved security of one such practical
design,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Quoting Ben Laurie <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
Yes, but you could know all this from cipher2 and RSA of SHA1(message),
so I still don't see what value is added by cipher1.
Without cipher1, implying (iv1, RSA(SHA1(message) || key1)) it is impossible
to determine the origin
Jerrold Leichter wrote:
>We've met the enemy, and he is us. *Any* secure computing kernel that can do
>the kinds of things we want out of secure computing kernels, can also do the
>kinds of things we *don't* want out of secure computing kernels.
I don't understand why you say that. You can buil
> | means that some entity is supposed to "trust" the kernel (what else?). If
> | two entities, who do not completely trust each other, are supposed to both
> | "trust" such a kernel, something very very fishy is going on.
>
> Why? If I'm going to use a time-shared machine, I have to trust that th
Financial Cryptography '04
9-12 February 2004
Key West, Florida, USA
Call for Participation
Financial Cryptography is the premier international
forum for education, exploration, and debate at the
heart of one theme: Money and tr
Quoting Ben Laurie <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> Yes, but you could know all this from cipher2 and RSA of SHA1(message),
> so I still don't see what value is added by cipher1.
Without cipher1, implying (iv1, RSA(SHA1(message) || key1)) it is impossible
to determine the originator of the message. Rem
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Quoting Ben Laurie <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
I don't see any value added by cipher1 - what's the point?
The message is encrypted, i.e, cipher1, then cipher1 is encrypted yeilding
cipher2.
Since symmetric_key1 of cipher1 is RSA_Encrypt(sender's private key), access
to send
The Financial Cryptography 2004 conference has quietly (!)
announced their accepted papers:
http://fc04.ifca.ai/program.htm
Read on for the full programme...
Accepted Papers
The Ephemeral Pairing Problem
Jaap-Henk Hoepman
Efficient Maximal Privacy in Voting and Anonymous
There have been more press releases about quantum crypto products
lately.
I will summarize my opinion simply -- even if they can do what is
advertised, they aren't very useful. They only provide link security,
and at extremely high cost. You can easily just run AES+HMAC on all
the bits crossing a
Stefan Lucks wrote:
>
> On Mon, 15 Dec 2003, Jerrold Leichter wrote:
>
> > | This is quite an advantage of smart cards.
> > However, this advantage is there only because there are so few smart cards,
> > and so few smart card enabled applications, around.
>
> Strangely enough, Carl Ellison assum
On Mon, 15 Dec 2003, Jerrold Leichter wrote:
> | This is quite an advantage of smart cards.
> However, this advantage is there only because there are so few smart cards,
> and so few smart card enabled applications, around.
Strangely enough, Carl Ellison assumed that you would have at most one
sm
On Mon, 15 Dec 2003, Carl Ellison wrote:
[I wrote]
> > The first difference is obvious. You can plug in and later
> > remove a smart
> > card at your will, at the point of your choice. Thus, for
> > home banking with
> > bank X, you may use a smart card, for home banking with bank Y you
> > discon
Stefan,
I have to disagree on most of these points.
See below.
- Carl
+--+
|Carl M. Ellison [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://theworld.com/~cme |
|PGP: 75C5 1814 C3E3 AAA7 3F31 47B9 73F1 7E3C 96E7 2B71
At 07:02 PM 12/15/2003 -0500, Jerrold Leichter wrote:
However, this advantage is there only because there are so few smart cards,
and so few smart card enabled applications, around.
A software only, networked smart card would solve the
chicken and egg problem. One such solution is
Tamper resistant
19 matches
Mail list logo
