Antonomasia writes:
From: Carl Ellison [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Some TPM-machines will be owned by people who decide to do what I
suggested: install a personal firewall that prevents remote attestation.
How confident are you this will be possible ? Why do you think the
remote attestation
At 02:01 PM 12/23/2003 -0500, Rich Salz wrote:
How many years have you been saying this, now? :) How do those modern
online environments achieve end-to-end content integrity and privacy? My
guess is that they don't; their use of private value-add networks made it
unnecessary. If my guess
Ian proposes below two draft-definitions for non-repudiation - legal and
technical. Lynn also sent us a bunch of definitions. Let's focus on the
technical/crypto one for now - after all this is a crypto forum (I agree
the legal one is also somewhat relevant to this forum).
In my work on secure
Yes, the term non-repudiation has been badly misused in
old PKIX WG drafts (in spite of warnings by myself and
others) and some crypto works of reference -- usually
by well-intentioned but otherwise misguided people trying
to add value to digital certificates.
However, IMO non-repudiation refers
I must confess I'm puzzled why you consider strong authentication
the same as remote attestation for the purposes of this analysis.
It seems to me that your note already identifies one key difference:
remote attestation allows the remote computer to determine if they wish
to speak with my
Amir,
my objection is to the word sender which, in definitions I've
read, refers to the human being associated with a particular key. As long
as we refer to a private key with no implication that this in any way incurs
liability for a human being, then I'm happy -- but e-commerce folks
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Stefan Kelm
Sent: Tuesday, December 23, 2003 1:44 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Non-repudiation (was RE: The PAIN mnemonic)
Ah. That's why they're trying to rename the corresponding keyUsage
At 02:29 PM 12/25/2003 +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote:
X.509 certs were designed to solve the problem of authenticating users to the
global X.500 directory. So they're good at what they were designed for
(solving a problem that doesn't exist [0]), and bad at everything else
(solving any other sort of
Amir,
I am glad to see that you are treating this seriously.
It is always possible to use the term non-repudiation for some
legitimately defined thing - but I personally would prefer not to use the
term because it has been tarred by over a decade of misuse (implying some
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.01/evote_pr.html
Wired 12.01: January 2004
Broken Machine Politics
Introducing the User-Friendly, Error-Free, Tamper-Proof Voting Machine of
the Future!
(WARNING: Satisfaction not guaranteed if used before 2006.)
By Paul O'Donnell
On a cool afternoon
] Thursday 25 December 2003, 17:13 Makka Time, 14:13 GMT
]
] Saudis swoop on DIY bomb guide
]
] Authorities in the kingdom have arrested five people after
] raiding computer shops selling compact disks containing
] hidden bomb-making instructions, a local newspaper reported
] on Thursday.
]
]
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/technology/3324883.stm
The BBC
Your Say
Friday, 26 December, 2003, 03:29 GMT
Microsoft aims to make spammers pay
By Jo Twist
BBC News Online technology reporter
Despite efforts to stem the billions of spam e-mails flooding inboxes,
unwanted messages are still
Carl Ellison wrote:
From where I sit, it is better to term these
as legal non-repudiability or cryptographic
non-repudiability so as to reduce confusion.
To me, repudiation is the action only of a human being (not of a key) and
therefore there is no such thing as cryptographic
Ian Grigg wrote:
Carl and Ben have rubbished non-repudiation
without defining what they mean, making it
rather difficult to respond.
I define it quite carefully in my paper, which I pointed to.
Now, presumably, they mean the first, in
that it is a rather hard problem to take the
cryptographic
Ben Laurie wrote:
Ian Grigg wrote:
Carl and Ben have rubbished non-repudiation
without defining what they mean, making it
rather difficult to respond.
I define it quite carefully in my paper, which I pointed to.
Ah. I did read your paper, but deferred any comment
on it, in part
On Sun, Dec 21, 2003 at 09:45:54AM -0700, Anne Lynn Wheeler wrote:
note, however, when I did reference PAIN as (one possible) security
taxonomy i tended to skip over the term non-repudiation and primarily
made references to privacy, authentication, and integrity.
In my eperience, the
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3324883.stm
Adam Back is part of this team, I think.
Similar approach to Camram/hahscash. Memory-based approaches have been
discussed. Why hasn't Camram explored them?
steve
BTW, Penny Black stamp was only used briefly. It was the Penny Red which
At 09:13 AM 12/26/03 -0800, Steve Schear wrote:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3324883.stm
Mr Wobber and his group calculated that if there are 80,000
seconds in a day, a computational price of a 10-second levy
would mean spammers would only be able to send about 8,000
messages a day, at
I did work at Microsoft for about a year after leaving ZKS, but I quit
a month or so ago (working for another startup again).
But for accuracy while I was at Microsoft I was not part of the
microsoft research/academic team that worked on penny black, though I
did exchange a few emails related to
Steve Schear wrote:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3324883.stm
Adam Back is part of this team, I think.
Similar approach to Camram/hahscash. Memory-based approaches have been
discussed. Why hasn't Camram explored them?
They were only invented recently, and indeed, I've been planning
Richard Johnson wrote:
On Sun, Dec 21, 2003 at 09:45:54AM -0700, Anne Lynn Wheeler wrote:
note, however, when I did reference PAIN as (one possible) security
taxonomy i tended to skip over the term non-repudiation and primarily
made references to privacy, authentication, and
In response to Ed and Amir,
I have to agree with Carl here and stress that the
issue is not that the definition is bad or whatever,
but the word is simply out of place. Repudiation is
an act of a human being. So is the denial of that
or any other act, to take a word from Ed's 1st definition.
At 01:34 AM 12/24/2003 -0800, Ed Gerck wrote:
However, IMO non-repudiation refers to a useful and
essential cryptographic primitive. It does not mean the
affirmation of a truth (which is authentication). It means
the denial of a falsity -- such as:
(1) the ability to prevent the effective denial
Oh yes forgot one comment:
One down-side of memory bound is that it is memory bound. That is to
say it will be allocated some amount of memory, and this would be
chosen to be enough memory to that a high end machine should not have
that much cache so think multiple MB, maybe 8MB, 16MB or
John Denker [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
] Thursday 25 December 2003, 17:13 Makka Time, 14:13 GMT
]
] Saudis swoop on DIY bomb guide
[...]
I suspect there is a lot more to this story..
The story could apply to any one of hundreds (thousands?) of hacker/warez CDs
available off-the-shelf in the
Carl Ellison [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Ah. That's why they're trying to rename the corresponding keyUsage bit
to contentCommitment then:
Maybe, but that page defines it as:
contentCommitment: for verifying digital signatures which are intended to
signal that the signer is committing to the
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