Re: Schneier: SHA-1 has been broken - Time for a second thought about SDLH ?

In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Ralf Senderek w rites: > >And that is why I ask to give the Shamir Discrete Logarithm Hash Funktion a se >cond >thought. At leeast we have a proof of collision resistance under the assumptio >n >that factoring is infeasible for the modulus used. > >And that it more

Re: Encryption plugins for gaim

In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Peter Saint-Andre writes: >On Tue, Mar 15, 2005 at 02:02:31PM -0500, Adam Fields wrote: >> On Tue, Mar 15, 2005 at 12:54:19PM -0600, Peter Saint-Andre wrote: >> > Why not help us make Jabber/XMPP more secure, rather than overloading >> > AIM? With AIM/MSN/Yahoo your

Re: how to phase in new hash algorithms?

Steven M. Bellovin wrote: So -- what should we as a community be doing now? There's no emergency on SHA1, but we do need to start, and soon. The wider question is how to get moving on new hash algorithms. That's a bit tricky. Normally we'd look to see NIST or the NESSIE guys lead a competition.

Re: NSA warned Bush it needed to monitor networks

-- On 18 Mar 2005 at 22:52, Steven M. Bellovin wrote: > That paragraph, believe it or not, was classified Secret. > For what it's worth, the official definition of "Secret", > from Executive Order 12958 > (http://www.dss.mil/seclib/eo12958.htm), is: > > "Secret" shall be applied to informatio

Re: Encryption plugins for gaim

On Tue, Mar 15, 2005 at 09:33:51PM +0100, Jim Cheesman wrote: | Ian G wrote: | | >Adam Fields wrote: | > | >>Given what may or may not be recent ToS changes to the AIM service, | >>I've recently been looking into encryption plugins for gaim. | >>Specifically, I note gaim-otr, authored by Ian G, wh

Non-repudiation

With all the discussion we've seen on this topic, I'm surprised no one has mentioned "Non-Repudiation in Electronic Commerce", by Jianying Zhou. I haven't read this book, but Rob Slade gave it a good review in a year-old RISKS that I happened to stumble across. Any comments from list members?

Off-the-Record Messaging

Off-the-Record Messaging News - Downloads - Mailing Lists - Documentation - Frequently Asked Questions - Press Off-the-Record (OTR) Messaging allows you to have private conversations over instant messaging by providing: Encryption No one else can read your insta

Re: NSA warned Bush it needed to monitor networks

A few days ago, I posted this: > >WASHINGTON (AP) -- The National Security Agency warned President >Bush in 2001 that monitoring U.S. adversaries would require a >``permanent presence'' on networks that also carry Americans' >messages that are protected from government eavesdropping. > >... > > >``

Cyber cops foil £220m Sumitomo bank raid

The Register Biting the hand that feeds IT The Register » Security » Network Security » Original URL: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/03/17/sumitomo_cyber-heist_foiled/ Cyber cops foil £220m Sumitomo bank rai

Westlaw agrees to restrict access to Social Security numbers

The San Jose Mercury News Posted on Thu, Mar. 17, 2005 Westlaw agrees to restrict access to Social Security numbers WASHINGTON (AP) - A legal research company said Thursday it wi

Proposed Law Against 'Phishing' Would Be Difficult to Enforce

The Wall Street Journal March 16, 2005 6:59 p.m. EST E-COMMERCE/MEDIA Proposed Law Against 'Phishing' Would Be Difficult to Enforce By DAVID KESMODEL THE WALL STREET JOURNAL ONLINE March 16, 2005 6:59 p.m. A proposed

Re: $90 for high assurance _versus_ $349 for low assurance

>John, thanks for this fascinating report! >Conclusion? `Not all CAs/certs are created equal`... therefore we >should NOT automatically trust the contents of every certificate >whose CA appears in the `root CA` list of the browser. Although some certs make more intrusive checks, it all strikes me

Re: Encryption plugins for gaim

> If you want encryption with authentication, there's the gaim-encryption > plugin. I get the feeling gaim-otr is for more specific circumstances. Actually, the only "specific circumstance" that OTR is really aimed at is the IM environment. That is, it's an encryption scheme specifically designed

how to phase in new hash algorithms?

We all understand the need to move to better hash algorithms than SHA1. At a minimum, people should be switching to SHA256/384/512; arguably, Whirlpool is the right way to go. The problem is how to get there from here. OpenSSL 0.9.7 doesn't even include anything stronger than SHA1. As a prac

Re: Security is the bits you disable before you ship

Steven M. Bellovin writes: > That's not new, either. I believe it was Tony Hoare who likened this > to sailors doing shore drills with life preservers, but leaving them > home when they went to sea. I think he said that in the 1970s; he said > this in his Turing Award lecture: > >

Re: PK -> OTP?

My educated-layman's opinion is that the following is not feasible, but I'd be happy to be shown wrong ... Given a closed public-key device such as a typical smart card with its limited set of operations (chiefly "sign"), is it possible to implement a challenge/response function such that * Both

Re: Encryption plugins for gaim

At 10:19 PM 3/13/2005, Adam Fields wrote: Given what may or may not be recent ToS changes to the AIM service, I've recently been looking into encryption plugins for gaim. AOL says that the ToS bits are only for things like chatrooms; user-to-user AIM traffic doesn't even go through their servers. T

Re: $90 for high assurance _versus_ $349 for low assurance

John, thanks for this fascinating report! Conclusion? `Not all CAs/certs are created equal`... therefore we should NOT automatically trust the contents of every certificate whose CA appears in the `root CA` list of the browser. Instead, browsers should allow users to select which CAs they trust

Re: $90 for high assurance _versus_ $349 for low assurance

On Tue, Mar 15, 2005 at 11:04:59AM -0500, Victor Duchovni wrote: > On Wed, Mar 16, 2005 at 02:23:49AM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote: > > Certainly with UIXC it's not worth anything. > > What is UIXC? lemme guess: universal & indiscriminate cross certification oh wait, peter did define it: "implicit

Reuters -- British Firm Breaks Ground in Surveillance Science

http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=topNews&storyID=7892255 British Firm Breaks Ground in Surveillance Science Mon Mar 14, 2005 08:08 AM ET By Mark Trevelyan, Security Correspondent MALVERN, England (Reuters

Re: Security is the bits you disable before you ship

* Peter Gutmann quotes CNET: > GCC 4.0 also introduces a security feature called Mudflap, [...] > So you have an interesting definition of a security feature as "the > bit you disable before the product goes into the environment where > it'll be subject to attack". Actually, mudflap is not a

Re: Encryption plugins for gaim

Ian G wrote: Adam Fields wrote: Given what may or may not be recent ToS changes to the AIM service, I've recently been looking into encryption plugins for gaim. Specifically, I note gaim-otr, authored by Ian G, who's on this list. Just a quick note of clarification, there is a collision in the nam

Re: PK -> OTP?

Matt Crawford wrote: My educated-layman's opinion is that the following is not feasible, but I'd be happy to be shown wrong ... Given a closed public-key device such as a typical smart card with its limited set of operations (chiefly "sign"), is it possible to implement a challenge/response fun

Schneier: SHA-1 has been broken - Time for a second thought about SDLH ?

Bruce Schneier wrote: (in Cryptogram) > SHA-1 has been broken. Not a reduced-round version. Not a simplified version. > The real thing. > > "One-way hash functions are supposed to have two properties. One, they're one > way. This means that it is easy to take a message and compute the hash val

Re: Encryption plugins for gaim

On Tue, Mar 15, 2005 at 02:14:48PM -0500, Ian Goldberg wrote: > OTR works over Jabber today. Granted, it's not very "Jabberish" (as far > as I understand the term; I don't know the Jabber protocol very well): > it just replaces the text of the message with ciphertext. [gaim, at > least, doesn't

Re: Encryption plugins for gaim

On Tue, Mar 15, 2005 at 02:02:31PM -0500, Adam Fields wrote: > On Tue, Mar 15, 2005 at 12:54:19PM -0600, Peter Saint-Andre wrote: > > Why not help us make Jabber/XMPP more secure, rather than overloading > > AIM? With AIM/MSN/Yahoo your account will always exist at the will of > > Unfortunately, I

Re: Encryption plugins for gaim

Ian Goldberg wrote: ...Unfortunately the original Jabber developers did not build encryption in from the beginning and the existing methods have not been implemented widely (OpenPGP over Jabber) or are not very Jabberish (RFC 3923), so we need to improve what we have. Contributions welcome. See her

Re: Do You Need a Digital ID?

R.A. Hettinga wrote: i've been asked to flush out my merged security taxonomy and glossary http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/index.html#glosnote to highlight the distinction between identity theft and account theft. typically id

Re: Encryption plugins for gaim

On Tue, Mar 15, 2005 at 02:47:35PM -0500, Ian Goldberg wrote: > > this is actually a very good solution for > > me. The only thing I don't like about it is that it stores the private > > key on your machine. I understand why that is, but it also means that > > if you switch machines with the same l

Re: Encryption plugins for gaim

On Tue, Mar 15, 2005 at 12:54:19PM -0600, Peter Saint-Andre wrote: > Why not help us make Jabber/XMPP more secure, rather than overloading > AIM? With AIM/MSN/Yahoo your account will always exist at the will of Unfortunately, I already have a large network of people who use AIM, and >they< all eac

Re: NSA names ECC as the exclusive technology for key agreement and digital signature standards for the U.S. government

Ian G wrote: NSA names ECC as the exclusive technology for key agreement and digital signature standards for the U.S. government Certicom's ECC-based solutions enable government contractors to add security that meets NSA guidelines I should note that OpenSSL also supports ECC. -- http://www.apache

Re: Crack in Computer Security Code Raises Red Flag

On Tue, 15 Mar 2005, The Wall Street Journal Wrote: > SHA-1 is a federal standard promulgated by the National > Institute of Standards and Technology and used by the government and > private sector for handling sensitive information. It is thought to be the > most widely used hash function, and