[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Hal Finney) writes:
Steven M. Bellovin writes:
Dan Bernstein has a new cache timing attack on AES:
http://cr.yp.to/antiforgery/cachetiming-20050414.pdf
This is a pretty alarming attack.
It is? Recovering a key from a server custom-written to act as an oracle for
the
Steven M. Bellovin writes:
|
| Ladies and Gentlemen,
|
| I'd like to come up to speed on the state of the
| art in de-identification (~=anonymization) of data
| especially monitoring data (firewall/hids logs, say).
| A little googling suggests that this is an academic
| subspeciality as
On Fri, Jun 17, 2005 at 11:57:29PM +1200, Peter Gutmann wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Hal Finney) writes:
Steven M. Bellovin writes:
Dan Bernstein has a new cache timing attack on AES:
http://cr.yp.to/antiforgery/cachetiming-20050414.pdf
This is a pretty alarming attack.
It is?
Wang et al. published their Crypto 2005 papers on SHA-0 and SHA-1
collisions. Maybe you find it interesting
http://www.infosec.sdu.edu.cn/people/wangxiaoyun.htm
Vlastimil Klima
--
Nechte si zasilat do mailu denni prehled nejzajimavejsich
clanku z portalu VOLNY. http://web.volny.cz/mailinfo/
Quoting:
The U.S. Department of Justice is quietly shopping around the
explosive idea of requiring Internet service providers to retain
records of their customers' online activities.
http://news.com.com/Your+ISP+as+Net+watchdog/2100-1028_3-5748649.html
--
Perry E. Metzger
Peter Gutman writes:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Hal Finney) writes:
Steven M. Bellovin writes:
Dan Bernstein has a new cache timing attack on AES:
http://cr.yp.to/antiforgery/cachetiming-20050414.pdf
This is a pretty alarming attack.
It is? Recovering a key from a server custom-written
Hal Finney wrote:
Steven M. Bellovin writes:
Dan Bernstein has a new cache timing attack on AES:
http://cr.yp.to/antiforgery/cachetiming-20050414.pdf
This is a pretty alarming attack. Bernstein was actually able to recover
the AES key using a somewhat artificial server which reported
