On Mon, Sep 19, 2005 at 02:54:14PM +0200, Amir Herzberg wrote:
> We now added a mechanism
> computes a hash of every unprotected site for which the user has
> assigned name/logo. TrustBar compares this hash on subsequent accesses
> to the same site. If the site is not modified in five subsequent
>
--- begin forwarded text
Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2005 10:56:52 -0400
To: "Philodox Clips List" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
From: "R.A. Hettinga" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: [Clips] RUXCON 2005 Update
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
--- begin for
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Peter Gutmann writes
:
>Found on the Daily WTF, http://www.thedailywtf.com/forums/43223/ShowPost.aspx:
>
> try {
>int idx = 0;
>
>while (true) {
> displayProductInfo(prodnums[idx]);
> idx++;
> }
>}
> catch (IndexOutOfBoundExcept
Found on the Daily WTF, http://www.thedailywtf.com/forums/43223/ShowPost.aspx:
try {
int idx = 0;
while (true) {
displayProductInfo(prodnums[idx]);
idx++;
}
}
catch (IndexOutOfBoundException ex) {
// nil
}
The editor also comments that when he
Most financial and other sensitive web sites use SSL/TLS to authenticate
the server and protect data from eavesdropping and from modification by
a Man In The Middle (MITM) adversary.
However, quite a few of these sites invoke SSL/TLS only _after_ user has
typed in her user name and pw, and clicke
>
> http://www.nccmembership.co.uk/pooled/articles/BF_WEBART/view.asp?Q=BF_WEBART_171100
Interesting article, but despite the title, there seems to be no
mention of any of the actual security (or privacy) challenges involved
in deploying massive RFID payment systems. E.g. I can extract money
fr
related ref:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm21.htm#11 Payment Tokens
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm21.htm#21 Payment Tokens
there is an interesting side light involving x.509 identity
certificate and the non-repudiation bit ... in the context of point of
sale terminals for financial transact
