On 10/23/05, Travis H. <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> My understanding of the peer-to-peer key agreement protocol (hereafter
> p2pka) is based on section 3.3 and 3.4.2 and is something like this:
>
> A -> B: N_ab
> B -> A: N_ba
> B -> A: Sign{f(N_ab)}_a
> A -> B: Sign{f(N_ba)}_b
> A -> B: Sign{A, K_a
On 10/22/05, Ian G <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> R. Hirschfeld wrote:
> > This is not strictly correct. The payer can reveal the blinding
> > factor, making the payment traceable. I believe Chaum deliberately
> > chose for one-way untraceability (untraceable by the payee but not by
> > the payer)
At 11:14 AM 10/24/2005, cyphrpunk wrote:
Note that e-gold, which originally sold non-reversibility as a key
benefit of the system, found that this feature attracted Ponzi schemes
and fraudsters of all stripes, and eventually it was forced to reverse
transactions and freeze accounts. It's not cle
From: cyphrpunk <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Oct 24, 2005 2:14 PM
Subject: Re: [fc-discuss] Financial Cryptography Update: On Digital Cash-like
Payment Systems
On 10/22/05, Ian G <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>Note that e-gold, which originally sold non-reversibility as a key
>benefit of the system,
On 10/24/05, Steve Schear <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I don't think E-gold ever held out its system as non-reversible with proper
> court order. All reverses I am aware happened either due to some technical
> problem with their system or an order from a court of competence in the
> matter at hand
On 10/24/05, John Kelsey <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> More to the point, an irreversible payment system raises big practical
> problems in a world full of very hard-to-secure PCs running the
> relevant software. One exploitable software bug, properly used, can
> steal an enormous amount of money i
--- begin forwarded text
Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2005 23:31:34 +0200
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: Hagai Bar-El <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Hello,
I wrote a short essay about anonymity and pseudonymity b
> http://www.hbarel.com/Blog/entry0006.html
>
> I believe that for anonymity and pseudonymity technologies to survive
> they have to be applied to applications that require them by design,
> rather than to mass-market applications that can also do (cheaper)
> without. If anonymity mechanisms a
I recall reading somewhere that the NSA got ahold of some KGB numeric
OTPs (in the standard five-digit groups). They found that they
contained corrections, typos, and showed definite non-random
characteristics. Specifically, they had a definite left-hand
right-hand alternation, and tended to not
At EuroOSCon, Rachel Willmer and I announced OpenPGP:SDK, a BSD-licensed
C library implementing the OpenPGP standard. The SDK is sponsored by
Nominet.
Although we are still very much in beta, feedback will be appreciated.
Permalink: http://www.links.org/?p=20
Cheers,
Ben.
--
http://www.apache
>From: cyphrpunk <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Sent: Oct 24, 2005 5:58 PM
>To: John Kelsey <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Subject: Re: [fc-discuss] Financial Cryptography Update: On Digital Cash-like
>Payment Systems
...
>Digital wallets will require real security in user PCs. Still I don't
>see why we don't alread
"And *where* do we put the CCD?"
-- Number one answer in a "Top Ten" quiz at the FC2K rump-session to a
description of a certain "Mickey Mouse" projector protocol...
Cheers,
RAH
-
--- begin forwarded text
Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2005 10:06:40 -0400
To: Philodox
| U.S. law generally requires that stolen goods be returned to the
| original owner without compensation to the current holder, even if
| they had been purchased legitimately (from the thief or his agent) by
| an innocent third party.
This is incorrect. The law draws a distinction between recogniz
| I recall reading somewhere that the NSA got ahold of some KGB numeric
| OTPs (in the standard five-digit groups). They found that they
| contained corrections, typos, and showed definite non-random
| characteristics. Specifically, they had a definite left-hand
| right-hand alternation, and tend
- Original Message -
From: "Travis H." <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: semi-preditcable OTPs
Despite [flawed OTPs], the NSA wasn't able to crack any messages.
My question is, why? I think I know the reason, and that is that any
predictability in a symbol of the OTP correlated to a pred
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "Trav
is H." writes:
>I recall reading somewhere that the NSA got ahold of some KGB numeric
>OTPs (in the standard five-digit groups). They found that they
>contained corrections, typos, and showed definite non-random
>characteristics. Specifically, they had a defi
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