How broad is the SPEKE patent.

-- Does SPEKE claim to patent any uses of zero knowledge proof of possession of the password for mutual authentication, or just some particular method for establishing communications? Is there any way around the SPEKE patent for mutual authentication and establishing secure communications on

Re: Fermat's primality test vs. Miller-Rabin

On Tue, 8 Nov 2005, Jeremiah Rogers wrote: > > It appears that Fermat's test can be fooled by Carmichael numbers, > > whereas Miller-Rabin is immune, but I'm not sure why. > > Where does it say Miller-Rabin is immune to Carmichael numbers? > [...] > To me it looks like M-R just eliminates some need

Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Skype security evaluation]

- Original Message - From: "Marcel Popescu" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: RE: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Skype security evaluation] From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:owner- [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Peter Gutmann I can't understand why they didn't just use TLS for the handshake (maybe YAS

RSA-640 factored

http://mathworld.wolfram.com/news/2005-11-08/rsa-640/ --Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

RSA-640 factored

From: November 8, 2005--A team at the German Federal Agency for Information Technology Security (BSI) recently announced the factorization of the 193-digit number 310 7418240490 0437213507 5003588856 7930037346 02284

Re: How broad is the SPEKE patent.

In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "James A. Donald" writes: >-- >Does SPEKE claim to patent any uses of zero knowledge >proof of possession of the password for mutual >authentication, or just some particular method for >establishing communications? Is there any way around >the SPEKE patent for

Re: RSA-640 factored

"Steven M. Bellovin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > http://mathworld.wolfram.com/news/2005-11-08/rsa-640/ There are timing details in: http://www.crypto-world.com/announcements/rsa640.txt They claim they need 5 months of 80 machines with 2.2GHz processors. Using these numbers, I think it would

[Clips] Sony BMG's DRM provider does not rule out future use of stealth

--- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Wed, 9 Nov 2005 10:50:05 -0500 To: Philodox Clips List <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> From: "R. A. Hettinga" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: [Clips] Sony BMG's DRM provider does not rule out future use of stealth Reply-To: [EMAIL PRO

Re: RSA-640 factored

On Wed, Nov 09, 2005 at 05:27:12PM +0100, Simon Josefsson wrote: > I'm not sure translating complexity into running time is reasonable, > but pending other ideas, this is a first sketch. > It is not reasonable, because the biggest constraint is memory, not CPU. Inverting the matrix requires incr

Re: RSA-640 factored

Victor Duchovni <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > On Wed, Nov 09, 2005 at 05:27:12PM +0100, Simon Josefsson wrote: > >> I'm not sure translating complexity into running time is reasonable, >> but pending other ideas, this is a first sketch. >> > > It is not reasonable, because the biggest constraint

Re: How broad is the SPEKE patent.

You may want to look at EAP-PAX. We tried to engineer around the patent land mines in the field when we designed it. This of course doesn't mean that someone won't claim it infringes on something. We also have a proof (not yet published) of security in a random oracle model. Best, Bill p

Re: gonzo cryptography; how would you improve existing cryptosystems?

On 4 Nov 2005, at 5:23 PM, Travis H. wrote: For example, pgp doesn't hide the key IDs of the addressees. But OpenPGP does. Here's an extract fro RFC 2440: 5.1. Public-Key Encrypted Session Key Packets (Tag 1) [...] An implementation MAY accept or use a Key ID of zero as a "wild card"