I stumbled on the following link:http://cryptome.org/dprk/dprk-papers.htm
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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At 14:47 11/10/2005 -0800, Charlie Kaufman wrote:
[... Radia Perlman and I] were approached by
David Jablon, the inventor of SPEKE but no longer
the patent holder, who suggested that we should
not assume that PDM did not infringe SPEKE and
should not make such claims to others. This was
based on
In Practical Cryptography, Schneier discusses a new PRNG design called Fortuna.
It has some neat features.
He also discusses problems with the ANSI PRNG here:
http://www.schneier.com/paper-prngs.html
--
http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ --
We already have enough fast, insecure systems.
The naive countermeasure to timing attacks is to add a random delay,
but of course that can be averaged out by repeating the computation.
I have never heard anyone propose a delay that is based on the input,
and maybe some per-machine secret, so that it is unpredictable but
constant. Of course
Some articles have been appearing in various web sites about flaws in
IPSec key negotiation protocols, such as this one:
http://news.com.com/VPN+flaw+threatens+Internet+traffic/2100-1002_3-5951916.html
I haven't been following the IPSec mailing lists of late -- can anyone
who knows details
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Perry E. Metzger writes:
Some articles have been appearing in various web sites about flaws in
IPSec key negotiation protocols, such as this one:
http://news.com.com/VPN+flaw+threatens+Internet+traffic/2100-1002_3-5951916.ht
ml
I haven't been following the IPSec
At 10:14 AM -0500 11/15/05, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Some articles have been appearing in various web sites about flaws in
IPSec key negotiation protocols, such as this one:
http://news.com.com/VPN+flaw+threatens+Internet+traffic/2100-1002_3-5951916.html
I haven't been following the IPSec
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Paul Hoffman writes:
At 10:14 AM -0500 11/15/05, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Some articles have been appearing in various web sites about flaws in
IPSec key negotiation protocols, such as this one:
Ron Rivest reported on some theoretical and practical experimental
work in Crypto 90, Finding Four Million Large Random Primes,
http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest/Rivest-FindingFourMillionLargeRandomPrimes.ps
A number n is a (base two) pseudoprime if it is composite and
satisfies the identity
At 2:29 PM -0500 11/15/05, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
I mostly agree with you, with one caveat: the complexity of a spec can
lead to buggier implementations.
Well, then we fully agree with each other. Look at the message
formats used in the protocols they have attacked successfully so far.
Bruce Schneier's newsletter Cryptogram has the following fascinating
link: http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/heath.pdf
It's the story of effects of a single spy who betrayed keys and
encryptor designs.
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
Steven M. Bellovin [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Bruce Schneier's newsletter Cryptogram has the following fascinating
link: http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/heath.pdf
It's the story of effects of a single spy who betrayed keys and
encryptor designs.
Very interesting indeed. I was unaware that the
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