the early history of NSA

2005-12-02 Thread Steven M. Bellovin
The Quest For Cryptologic Centralization and the Establishment of NSA: 1940-1952 http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/quest.pdf --Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb - The Cryptography Mailing List

Re: Encryption using password-derived keys

2005-12-02 Thread Alexander Klimov
On Tue, 29 Nov 2005, Jack Lloyd wrote: The basic scenario I'm looking at is encrypting some data using a password-derived key (using PBKDF2 with sane salt sizes and iteration counts). [...] My inclination is to use the PBKDF2 output as a key encryption key, rather than using it to directly

Re: Session Key Negotiation

2005-12-02 Thread Will Morton
Eric Rescorla wrote: May I ask why you don't just use TLS? I would if I could, believe me. :o) The negotiated key will be used for both reliable (TCP-like) and non-reliable (UDP-like) connections, all tunnelled over a single UDP port for NAT-busting purposes. For the TCP-like component,

Re: Session Key Negotiation

2005-12-02 Thread Richard Salz
I am designing a transport-layer encryption protocol, and obviously wish to use as much existing knowledge as possible, in particular TLS, which AFAICT seems to be the state of the art. In general, it's probably a good idea to look at existing mechanisms and analyze why they're not

Re: Encryption using password-derived keys

2005-12-02 Thread John Kelsey
From: Jack Lloyd [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Nov 29, 2005 11:08 AM To: cryptography@metzdowd.com Subject: Encryption using password-derived keys The basic scenario I'm looking at is encrypting some data using a password-derived key (using PBKDF2 with sane salt sizes and iteration counts). I am not

Re: Fermat's primality test vs. Miller-Rabin

2005-12-02 Thread Nicolas Rachinsky
* Joseph Ashwood [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2005-11-22 02:50 -0800]: - Original Message - From: Anton Stiglic [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: Fermat's primality test vs. Miller-Rabin -Original Message- From: [Joseph Ashwood] Subject: Re: Fermat's primality test vs. Miller-Rabin

security modifications to current PCs

2005-12-02 Thread Travis H.
Hey, I've been reading through the TCPA documents and thinking a bit about changes that might give higher assurance to an ordinary PC, or at least a PC with only minor changes. Specifically, one of the things I've always been mulling over is a secure boot sequence. Basically, like the TCPA, I

Re: Haskell crypto

2005-12-02 Thread Travis H.
IMO it is pointless to write SHA in a language that ``can have properties of programs proved,'' because test vectors are good enough, and there is no real assurance that when you write the specification in a machine-readable form you do not make the same mistake as in your code. I think you

Re: Fermat's primality test vs. Miller-Rabin

2005-12-02 Thread Joseph Ashwood
- Original Message - From: Nicolas Rachinsky [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Fermat's primality test vs. Miller-Rabin * Joseph Ashwood [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2005-11-22 02:50 -0800]: 16384 times .. If I remember the proof of MR correctly it assumes an odd number. Were

Re: Broken SSL domain name trust model

2005-12-02 Thread leichter_jerrold
| ...basically, there was suppose to be a binding between the URL the user | typed in, the domain name in the URL, the domain name in the digital | certificate, the public key in the digital certificate and something | that certification authorities do. this has gotten terribly obfuscated | and

Re: Broken SSL domain name trust model

2005-12-02 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: One can look at this in more general terms. For validation to mean anything, what's validated has to be the semantically meaningful data - not some incidental aspect of the transaction. The SSL model was based on the assumption that the URL was semantically

[Clips] Banks Seek Better Online-Security Tools

2005-12-02 Thread R. A. Hettinga
--- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2005 16:54:00 -0500 To: Philodox Clips List [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: R. A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [Clips] Banks Seek Better Online-Security Tools Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

RE: Encryption using password-derived keys

2005-12-02 Thread Anton Stiglic
It can be useful to derive a key encryption key from the password, and not use the key derived from the password to directly encrypt data you want to protect, when the resulting ciphertext can be found in different places where your encrypted key won't necessarly also be found. For example, to

Re: Broken SSL domain name trust model

2005-12-02 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: One can look at this in more general terms. For validation to mean anything, what's validated has to be the semantically meaningful data - not some incidental aspect of the transaction. The SSL model was based on the assumption that the URL was semantically

Proving the randomness of a random number generator?

2005-12-02 Thread Lee Parkes
Hi, Apologies if this has been asked before. The company I work for has been asked to prove the randomness of a random number generator. I assume they mean an PRNG, but knowing my employer it could be anything.. I've turned the work down on the basis of having another gig that week. However, it