On 4/2/06, Travis H. <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> So I'm reading up on unconditionally secure authentication in Simmon's
> "Contemporary Cryptology", and he points out that with RSA, given d,
> you could calculate e (remember, this is authentication not
> encryption) if you could factor n, which re
At 1:41 -0600 2006/04/02, Travis H. wrote:
So I'm reading up on unconditionally secure authentication in Simmon's
"Contemporary Cryptology", and he points out that with RSA, given d,
you could calculate e (remember, this is authentication not
encryption) if you could factor n, which relates the
On Sat, Apr 01, 2006 at 12:35:12PM +0100, Ben Laurie wrote:
> However, anyone I show this proof to can then masquerade as a silver
> member, using my signed nonce. So, it occurred to me that an easy
> way to prevent this is to create a private/public key pair and
> instead of the nonce use the hash
I came across the same problem a couple of years ago (and indeed
iterated through private/public key solutions with a colleague). The
problem is that you can still give your private key to somebody else.
There's no real deterrent unless that private key is used for many
other purposes, th
So I'm reading up on unconditionally secure authentication in Simmon's
"Contemporary Cryptology", and he points out that with RSA, given d,
you could calculate e (remember, this is authentication not
encryption) if you could factor n, which relates the two. However,
the implication is in the less
