Re: Status of opportunistic encryption

2006-06-03 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler
James A. Donald wrote: I was unaware of this. So I googled for DNSSEC. Reading the DNSSEC documents I found : :In order to support the larger DNS message : :sizes that result from adding the DNSSEC RRs, : :DNSSEC also requires EDNS0 support ([RFC : :671]). and : :its

Re: Status of opportunistic encryption

2006-06-03 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler
James A. Donald wrote: In an organization with hundreds of administrators managing tens of thousand of machines, what goes wrong with trusting your key store? And who administers Kerberos? Don't they have a problem with tens of thousands of machines? the original pk-init draft for kerberos

Re: Status of SRP

2006-06-03 Thread James A. Donald
-- Jeffrey Altman wrote: Unfortunately, SRP is not the solution to the phishing problem. The phishing problem is made up of many subtle sub-problems involving the ease of spoofing a web site and the challenges involved in securing the enrollment and password change mechanisms. With SRP,

Re: Status of SRP

2006-06-03 Thread James A. Donald
-- Lance James wrote: Here's where SRP fails: 1) SSL is built into the browser - doesn't stop phishers SSL protects true names, SRP protects true relationships. Protecting true names turned out to be not very useful. Hi, we're having a problem with your account system as our SRP

Re: Status of SRP

2006-06-03 Thread Florian Weimer
* Ka-Ping Yee: Passpet's strategy is to customize a button that you click. We are used to recognizing toolbar buttons by their appearance, so it seems plausible that if the button has a custom per-user icon, users are unlikely to click on a spoofed button with the wrong icon. Unlike other

Re: Status of SRP

2006-06-03 Thread Florian Weimer
* Anne Lynn Wheeler: Florian Weimer wrote: If you've deployed two-factor authentication (like German banks did in the late 80s/early 90s), the relevant attacks do involve compromised customer PCs. 8-( Just because you can't solve it with your technology doesn't mean you can pretend the

Re: Status of SRP

2006-06-03 Thread Ka-Ping Yee
On Thu, 1 Jun 2006, Jeffrey Altman wrote: Solving the phishing problem requires changes on many levels: I agree. (1) Some form of secure chrome for browsers must be deployed where the security either comes from a trusted desktop or by per-user customizations that significantly

Re: Status of SRP

2006-06-03 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler
Florian Weimer wrote: FINREAD is really interesting. I've finally managed to browse the specs, and it looks as if this platform can be used to build something that is secure against compromised hosts. However, I fear that the support costs are too high, and that's why it hasn't caught on in

Re: Status of SRP

2006-06-03 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler
Anne Lynn Wheeler wrote: if they can build a $100 PC ... you think that they could build a finread terminal for a couple bucks. sometimes there are issues with volume pricing ... you price high because there isn't a volume and there isn't a volume because you price high. re: