Re: Status of attacks on AES?

2006-06-06 Thread Steven M. Bellovin
On Sun, 4 Jun 2006 16:52:38 -0500, Marcos el Ruptor [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: http://defectoscopy.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=3 http://defectoscopy.com/results.html and http://defectoscopy.com/background.html Are there any peer-reviewed descriptions of your technique? Right now, all that

RE: Status of attacks on AES?

2006-06-06 Thread Whyte, William
Isn't what you are referring to called secure number of rounds? In other words the number of rounds after which no known attack exists that can break the cipher faster than brute-forcing the key? It looks like I have no choice but to invent a new term, PRF rounds - the number of rounds

Re: Trusted path (was: status of SRP)

2006-06-06 Thread leichter_jerrold
| ...This is the trusted-path problem. Some examples of proposed | solutions to trusted-path are: | | - Dim the entire screen. | - Use special window borders. | - Use flashing window borders. | - Use specially shaped windows. | - Attach a warning label to all untrusted

Re: Status of opportunistic encryption

2006-06-06 Thread James A. Donald
Thomas Harold: I do suspect at some point that the lightweight nature of DNS will give way to a heavier, encrypted or signed protocol. Economic factors will probably be the driving force (online banking). Thierry Moreau wrote: E.g. RFC4033, RFC4034, RFC4035. Well I wish it was going

Re: Status of attacks on AES?

2006-06-06 Thread Marcos el Ruptor
Can you briefly explain how you determine the PRF rounds value? William Your question belongs in our forums - http://defectoscopy.com/forum/viewforum.php?f=3 where it's already being discussed. Ruptor [Moderator's note: no, actually, if you're going to mention it here, you had better be

Re: Status of opportunistic encryption

2006-06-06 Thread Peter Gutmann
kent crispin [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: On Thu, Jun 01, 2006 at 01:47:06PM +1200, Peter Gutmann wrote: Grab OpenVPN (which is what OpenSWAN should be), install, point it at the target system, and you have opportunistic encryption. Forgive my doltishness, but could you expand on that just a bit,

Re: Status of SRP

2006-06-06 Thread Florian Weimer
* Anne Lynn Wheeler: Florian Weimer wrote: FINREAD is really interesting. I've finally managed to browse the specs, and it looks as if this platform can be used to build something that is secure against compromised hosts. However, I fear that the support costs are too high, and that's why

U. Washington Crypto Course Available Online For Free

2006-06-06 Thread Udhay Shankar N
http://it.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/06/04/1311243 -- ((Udhay Shankar N)) ((udhay @ pobox.com)) ((www.digeratus.com)) - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: Status of SRP

2006-06-06 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler
Florian Weimer wrote: You mean something like remote attestation? I find it hard to believe that this capability is available today in a relatively open environment, on a platform supporting multiple applications developed by different applications. re:

Re: U. Washington Crypto Course Available Online For Free

2006-06-06 Thread Max
I do not understand why this course got so much attention. What is special about it (besides available video lectures)? I have a whole collection of links to similar courses. Please take a look at http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/users/maxal/e-books.html Just as an example, I can mention UCSD based

Re: U. Washington Crypto Course Available Online For Free

2006-06-06 Thread John R. Black
On Tue, Jun 06, 2006 at 01:57:25AM -0700, Udhay Shankar N wrote: http://it.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/06/04/1311243 It is taught by good people, but I find it a bit strange they are all Microsoft employees. This is perhaps because U. Wash doesn't have any cryptographers. That changes in