Lance James wrote:
Agreed, and since my research is focused on online banking I can see
yours and my point, either way, SecurID should not be the only concept
for dependence.
as i've mentioned serveral times, in the mid-90s, the x9a10 financial
standards working group was given the task of
Adam Back wrote:
Hi Ben, Travis
IGE if this description summarized by Travis is correct, appears to be
a re-invention of Anton Stiglic and my proposed FREE-MAC mode.
However the FREE-MAC mode (below described as IGE) was broken back in
Mar 2000 or maybe earlier by Gligor, Donescu and Iorga.
Leichter, Jerry wrote:
| It is known, that given such an oracle, the attacker can ask for
| decryption of all primes less than B, and then he will be able to
| sign PKCS-1 encoded messages if the representative number is B-smooth,
| but is there any way to actually recover d itself?
RSA is
--
Ben Laurie wrote:
Subject:
[dnsop] BIND and OpenSSL's RSA signature forging issue
From:
Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date:
Fri, 08 Sep 2006 11:40:44 +0100
To:
DNSEXT WG namedroppers@ops.ietf.org, (DNSSEC deployment)
[EMAIL PROTECTED], dnsop@lists.uoregon.edu
To:
DNSEXT WG
--
James A. Donald:
One way of doing this would be for the MTA to insist
on a valid signature when talking to certain well
known MTAs, and then my MUA could whitelist mail
sent from those well known MTAs
Paul Hoffman wrote:
Yes, if you are willing to throw out messages whose
I don't follow. For RSA, the only difference between encryption and
decryption, and public and private key, and hence between chosen
plaintext and chosen ciphertext, is the arbitrary naming of one of
a pair of mutually-inverse values as the private key and the other
as the public key.
James A. Donald wrote:
--
Ben Laurie wrote:
Subject:
[dnsop] BIND and OpenSSL's RSA signature forging issue
From:
Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date:
Fri, 08 Sep 2006 11:40:44 +0100
To:
DNSEXT WG namedroppers@ops.ietf.org, (DNSSEC deployment)
[EMAIL PROTECTED],
--
Adam Back wrote:
Hi Ben, Travis
IGE if this description summarized by Travis is
correct, appears to be a re-invention of Anton Stiglic
and my proposed FREE-MAC mode. However the FREE-MAC
mode (below described as IGE) was broken back in Mar
2000 or maybe earlier by Gligor, Donescu
| | It is known, that given such an oracle, the attacker can ask for
| | decryption of all primes less than B, and then he will be able to
| | sign PKCS-1 encoded messages if the representative number is B-smooth,
| | but is there any way to actually recover d itself?
|
| RSA is
On Sun, Sep 10, 2006 at 08:30:53AM +1000, James A. Donald wrote:
--
Ben Laurie wrote:
Subject:
[dnsop] BIND and OpenSSL's RSA signature forging issue
From:
Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date:
Fri, 08 Sep 2006 11:40:44 +0100
To:
DNSEXT WG namedroppers@ops.ietf.org, (DNSSEC
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