On Sep 16, 2006, at 11:31 PM, Eric Young wrote:
This is a question I would not mind having answered; while the
exponent 3 attack works when there are low bits to 'modify', there
has been talk of an attack where the ASN.1 is correctly right
justified (hash is the least significant bytes),
--
imon Josefsson wrote:
Again, there is no problem in ASN.1 or PKCS#1 that is
being exploited here, only an implementation flaw,
even if it is an interesting one.
But why did several people independently implement the
same or similar flaws?
The answer is in Jack Lloyd's post:
I wrote a
On Fri, 15 Sep 2006, Jostein Tveit wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Peter Gutmann) writes:
What's more scary is that if anyone introduces a parameterised hash
(it's quite possible that this has already happened in some fields,
and with the current interest in randomised hashes it's only a
I've been notified that we had a paper accepted for the cryptographers'
track. If you're concerned about that track, you could try contacting
Masayuki Abe, the PC Chair, directly. If you're interested in other
tracks I'm not sure what to suggest.
William
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL
William,
I've been notified that we had a paper accepted for the
cryptographers' track. If you're concerned about that track,
you could try contacting Masayuki Abe, the PC Chair,
directly. If you're interested in other tracks I'm not sure
what to suggest.
thanks for your mail, but my
