Forwarded: Request for Comments on primality testing

2007-01-24 Thread Steven M. Bellovin
From: Elaine Barker [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Request for Comments on primality testing Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2007 16:18:59 -0500 X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version NIST received many comments when Draft FIPS 186-3 was posted for public comment during the spring

Re: more on NIST hash competition

2007-01-24 Thread Ivan Krstić
Perry E. Metzger wrote: I'm completely unfamiliar with the way NIST operates, but I've been wondering for years why they haven't organized this competition already. Do we have a list veteran who can shed some light on why it took them this

Re: analysis and implementation of LRW

2007-01-24 Thread Peter Gutmann
David Wagner [EMAIL PROTECTED] Jim Hughes writes: The IEEE P1619 standard group has dropped LRW mode. It has a vulnerability that that are collisions that will divulge the mixing key which will reduce the mode to ECB. Peter Gutmann asks: Is there any more information on this anywhere? I

Re: Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases

2007-01-24 Thread Bill Stewart
With 4K possible salts, you'd need a very large password file to have more than a very few collisions, Definition of very large can vary. (alliteration intended).[...] UCSD has maybe 60,000 active users. I think very large is very common in the University environment. Different decade,

Re: analysis and implementation of LRW

2007-01-24 Thread Peter Gutmann
David Wagner [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: That is indeed an interesting requirement, and one that seems to legitimately rule out a number of existing modes of operation for IEEE P1619. From reading through the followup discussions, I think there's a strong desire to not standardise something that's

OT: SSL certificate chain problems

2007-01-24 Thread Travis H.
Hi, This is not really typical of the traffic on this list, hence the OT. I send it because I think this is one of the few places where I'll find some people with deep understanding of SSL certs. Recently I had an issue where Google checkout would not accept an SSL certificate because Apache

Re: analysis and implementation of LRW

2007-01-24 Thread David Wagner
Thanks to everyone who responded with more information about IEEE P1619. Here are some of the additional links, with my reactions: Andrea Pasquinucci points to: Ben Laurie points to:

Attacking the hash (WAS: Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases)

2007-01-24 Thread Allen
Hi gang, As an outsider, sort of, looking in I had an interesting thought about this. Since insider threats are the biggest problem, what vector could an insider use against password hashes to gain root password access? The problem with Rainbow tables is that they would be too massive when