Forwarded message:
From: Jack Cole [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: IEEE 1667 Approved December 5, 2006
Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2007 13:57:15 -0500
Reply-To: Jack Cole [EMAIL PROTECTED]
IEEE Press Release at
http://standards.ieee.org/announcements/pr_IEEE1667_new.html
IEEE 1667, Standard Protocol for
At 8:22 PM -0500 1/23/07, Ivan Krstiç wrote:
Perry E. Metzger wrote:
http://www.csrc.nist.gov/pki/HashWorkshop/index.html
I'm completely unfamiliar with the way NIST operates, but I've been
wondering for years why they haven't organized this competition already.
Do we have a list veteran who
--
Perry E. Metzger wrote:
It used to be that Verizon (my local phone company,
sadly) had this general problem but you could click on
log in and it would direct you to a secure page with
a little error message and you could then enter your
username and password. They've since fixed that
Am Dienstag, den 23.01.2007, 20:47 -0600 schrieb Travis H.:
Verify return code: 21 (unable to verify the first certificate)
---
DONE
I can't seem to get that certificate chain to have any contents other
than what you see above, no matter what I do, and hence can't get rid
of the Verify
Hi,
you should provide the whole chain starting from the CA that issued the server
cert. Be careful, though, because you should *NOT* provide the root cert
in the chain as well.
Moreover you should use the:
SSLCertificateChainFile
not the SSLCACertificateFile (which is for client
David Wagner wrote:
[snip]
Another possible interpretation of (2) is that if you use LRW to encrypt
close to 2^64 blocks of plaintext, and if you are using a 128-bit block
cipher, then you have a significant chance of a birthday collision,
Am I doing the math correctly that 2^64 blocks of
The wikipedia page on the IEEE SISWG debate about LRW says:
[A] general security requirement for any block cipher, regardless of
mode of operation, is that no block cipher should be used to encrypt
any more data, without changing the key, when the probability of a
collision becomes not negligible
On Wed, Jan 24, 2007 at 03:28:50PM -0800, Allen wrote:
David Wagner wrote:
[snip]
Another possible interpretation of (2) is that if you use LRW to encrypt
close to 2^64 blocks of plaintext, and if you are using a 128-bit block
cipher, then you have a significant chance of a birthday
To clarify a couple of points with regard to IEEE P1619 and LRW.
The original proposal which P1619 called LRW was actually a particular
concrete instantiation of a general construction from the LRW paper
(Liskov, Rivest and Wagner, Tweakable Block Ciphers, Crypto 02,
