Re: Governance of anonymous financial services

2007-04-03 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler

Ian G wrote:
OK, on the face of it, you seem to have been doing triple entry (with 
the twist of a hash).  Actually I am not so sure that it is even twisted 
... as you are simply saying that someone somewhere was logging the 
hash;  but not who was storing the receipts.

To point:  is this written up anywhere?  gollum  did I really ask 
that? ;)

I wrote this concept up in a paper and am very happy to expand to 
include other art and implementations, given more than copious free time...

I'm integrating (or should be) the work that Todd Boyle has done on 
accounting, because his concept is more rather than less analogous.

re: Governance of anonymous financial 

so applying x9.59

mapping to iso 8583 (i.e. credit transactions, debit transactions ... and even 
number of stored-value transactions carried by some point-of-sale terminal and
... at least part of the financial network)

you have the standard iso8583 financial transactions with a x9.59 addenda ... 
that includes
a digital signature, a hash of the receipt and some misc. other stuff.

existing infrastructure advises that both merchant and consumer retain (paper) 
receipts (in
case of disputes). x9.59 financial standard didn't specify/mandate how that 
might be
done ... but provided for support for applications for doing.

the financial transaction was already required to be archived/logged for all 
sorts of
regulations and business processes (as evidence some number of recent breach references). 

In the mid-90s, the x9a10 financial standard working group had been given the 
to preserve the integrity of the financial infrastructure for ALL retail 
payments. In numerous
other references I've mentioned that doing required taking into account all 
sorts of
considerations as part of x9.59 standard (including countermeasures to 
fraudulent transactions
from breaches), it had to be extremely lightweight because of numerous 
considerations when
you are asked to consider ALL retail transactions (including looking forward to 
various c
ontactless, wireless, cellphones, transit turnstyles, etc), and maximizing the 
use of all the existing processes and flows.

In any case, as a result, the x9.59 transaction would be logged/archived as 
part of existing standard financial transaction processes ... which includes the digital 
signature against the
full transaction ... where the full transaction ... along with the digital 
is being logged ... including the receipt hash and the additional x9.59 
specified fields.

the receipt, that is hashed, isn't specified as part of the x9.59 protocol 
... but is assumed to be whatever is necessary to support resolution, in case of any 
dispute (at least the equivalent of saying that both the merchant and consumer retained

paper receipt copies in the case of dispute).

we actually may have done too good a job. a lot of efforts that have worked on 
doing similar
or related efforts ... essentially viewed it as profit opportunities. the x9a10 
worked view all the stuff as added expense ... to be aggressively eliminated 
as much as
possible. For instance in the AADS chip strawman

in the mid-90s, i would semi-facetiously say that we would take a $500 mil-spec part, 
aggressively cost reduce it by 2-3 orders of magnitude, increase its security/integrity,
have it form-factor agnostic (as well as being able to meet contactless transit turnstyle 

to compound the problem ... we also did a bit of work on being able to change 
institutional-centric something you have authentication paradigm to a 
paradigm ... i.e. rather than having one something per institution ... you 
could have
one (or a very few) somethings per person (could be viewed as creating the 
something you are
biometric authentication analogy for something you have authentication). 
misc. past
posts mentioning 3-factor authentication paradigm

so having something that was aggressively cost reduced by 2-3 orders of 
magnitude, more
secure ... and instead of having one per institution/environment (that a person was 
involved with), they would have only one (or a very few). overall this could have represented

possibly four orders of magnitude cost reduction (that many others were viewing 
as potential
profit opportunity).

in any case, who would be the stack-holders interested in something that 
eliminates nearly all
fraud and nearly all costs?

a few past posts mentioning working on change-over to a person-centric 
paradigm: Crypto to defend chip IP: snake oil 
or good idea? Why security training is really 
important (and 

Re: Governance of anonymous financial services

2007-04-03 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler

re: Governance of anonymous financial 
services Governance of anonymous financial 

My wife has been gone five years and I've been gone for over a year (they had
corporate re-org in Dec '05) ... and we have no rights/interest ... but they
continue to trickle out

latest today (3Apr2007) ... hot off the press:

Method and system for using electronic communications for an electronic contract


A method and system for digitally signing an electronic contract document. An 
communication contains an identifier, a message, which includes the document, and a digital 
signature generated with a private key of an asymmetric key pair (247). The identifier may be 
used to retrieve a corresponding public key (287) and account information pertaining to the 
sender of the message. The public key may be used to authenticate the sender and the message. 
A device containing the private key may be used to protect the privacy thereof. The device may 
also generate a verification status indicator corresponding to verification data input into the device. The indicator may also be used as evidence that the sender of a contract document performed 
an overt act in causing the electronic communication to be digitally signed. A security profile 
linked to the public key in a secure database indicates security characteristics of the device. 

... snip ...

for a little drift ... slightly related to this recent posting in sci.crypt Electronic signature outside Europe

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WEP cracked even worse

2007-04-03 Thread Perry E. Metzger

Not that WEP has been considered remotely secure for some time, but
the best crack is now down to 40,000 packets for a 50% chance of
cracking the key.


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