Hal Finney wrote:
[snip]
http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=
By this point in our series on AACS (the encryption scheme used in
HD-DVD and Blu-ray) it should be clear that AACS creates a nontrivial
strategic game between the AACS central authority (representing the
movie studios) and
Ian G wrote:
Hal Finney wrote:
Perry Metzger writes:
Once the release window has passed,
the attacker will use the compromise aggressively and the authority
will then blacklist the compromised player, which essentially starts
the game over. The studio collects revenue during the release
On 5/2/07, Perry E. Metzger [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
cryptographic keys, and in further technical discussion of AACS
and similar DRM technologies.
Actually does anyhow have anything about the damage control process of
key management of AACS or SPDC (BD+).
Personally, I'm interested in
At 11:32 AM 5/2/2007, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Anyone very familiar with AACS have ideas on what optimal attack and
defense strategies are? This seems like a fertile new ground for
technical discussion.
Ed Felton wrote and excellent piece on AACS from the technical and
economic/tactical
Florian Weimer wrote:
With sign, then encrypt, it's also possible that the receiver decrypts
the message, and then leaks it, potentially giving the impression that
the signer authorized the disclosure. There has been a fair bit of
buzz about this confusion. But the lesson from that seems to be
At 03:52 PM 5/2/2007, Ian G wrote:
Hal Finney wrote:
Perry Metzger writes:
Once the release window has passed,
the attacker will use the compromise aggressively and the authority
will then blacklist the compromised player, which essentially starts
the game over. The studio collects revenue
Article AACS cracks cannot be revoked, says hacker
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070415-aacs-cracks-cannot-be-revoked-says-hacker.html
Excerpt: The latest attack vector bypasses the encryption performed
by the Device Keys -- the same keys that were revoked by the WinDVD
update -- and
http://www.xkcd.com/c257.html
--
Perry E. Metzger[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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On Thu, May 03, 2007 at 10:25:34AM -0700, Steve Schear wrote:
At 03:52 PM 5/2/2007, Ian G wrote:
This seems to assume that when a crack is announced, all revenue
stops. This would appear to be false. When cracks are announced in such
systems, normally revenues aren't strongly effected.
My favorite ...
http://www.geogreeting.com/view.html?zl1erV5i+mReSdx7+nTAh$$M+ohilV14
+xq_G
On May 2, 2007, at 2:09 PM, Udhay Shankar N wrote:
At 10:27 AM 5/2/2007, Aram Perez wrote:
http://farm1.static.flickr.com/191/480556169_6d731d2416_o.jpg
From another list:
This was one of my
Hal Finney wrote:
My question to the assembled: are cryptographic keys really subject to
DMCA subject to takedown requests? I suspect they are not
copyrightable under the criterion from the phone directory
precedent.
A sample demand letter from the AACS Licensing Authority appears at:
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