| Just being able to generate traffic over the link isn't enough to
| carry out this attack.
|
| Well, it depends on if you key per-flow or just once for the link. If
| the latter, and you have the ability to create traffic over the link,
| and there's a 1-for-1 correspondence between
Nicolas Williams wrote:
Subject: Re: no surprise - Sun fails to open source the crypto part of Java
Were you not surprised because you knew that said source is encumbered,
or because you think Sun has some nefarious motive to not open source
that code?
Third option: the architecture of
On Wed, 9 May 2007, Ali, Saqib wrote:
What about DRM/ERM that uses TPM? With TPM the content is pretty much
tied to a machine (barring screen captures etc)
Will ERM/DRM be ineffective even with the use of TPM?
ERM/DRM/TPM are such poorly defined and implemented products that people have
Ian G wrote:
Third option: the architecture of Sun's Java crypto
framework is based on motives that should have been avoided,
and have come back to bite (again).
The crypto framework in Java as designed by Sun was built on
motives (nefarious, warped or just plain stupid, I don't
* Ian G.:
My worry was that they hadn't open sourced the architecture component,
the part that wasn't meant to be replaceable. However even if open
sourced, Sun may still wield a stick over the providers by insisting
that they manage the signing process for the providers.
The signing
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Ian G) on Monday, May 14, 2007 wrote:
Third option: the architecture of Sun's Java crypto
framework is based on motives that should have been avoided,
and have come back to bite (again).
I think it is likely that Sun architected the Java crypto framework to
be able to obey
Jason Holt wrote:
ERM/DRM/TPM are such poorly defined and implemented products that people
have started referring to a DRM fairy who people assume will wave her
wand and solve whatever problem is at hand. I used to try to draw out
the mentioner's claims into a concrete proposal that everyone
Jason Holt wrote:
So I guess the answer to your question is We'd better
assume that DRM+TPM will be ineffective until we've
subjected a specific implementation of it to the same
level of scrutiny we apply to other cryptosystems, and
since DRM+TPM proposals tend to be much more
complicated
