Re: Levels of security according to the easiness to steel biometric data

2008-04-16 Thread Philipp Gühring
Hi, QUESTION: Does anybody knows about the existence of a security research in area of grading the easiness to steel biometric data. There are several relevant threats: * Accidental leaking the biometric data (colour-photos for face, fingerprints on glasses for fingers, public documents for

Re: Levels of security according to the easiness to steel biometric data

2008-04-16 Thread Richard Clayton
In article [EMAIL PROTECTED], Danilo Gligoroski [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes For example, I guess that stealing information of someone's face is easier than stealing information about someone's fingerprints, but stealing information about someone's retina would be much harder. if you meant retina

Re: Levels of security according to the easiness to steel biometric data

2008-04-16 Thread Ali, Saqib
I believe ISC2 (https://www.isc2.org/ ) did some testing and published their findings. Maybe someone from ISC2 on this list can give you the exact reference to that material. saqib http://doctrina.wordpress.com/ On Mon, Mar 31, 2008 at 11:10 AM, Danilo Gligoroski [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi,

Re: how to read information from RFID equipped credit cards

2008-04-16 Thread Peter Gutmann
Victor Duchovni [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Lock USB down completely, or block most devices and allow approved ones? There is a non-empty set folks doing the latter, which opens the possibility of this type of device being permitted, while others are restricted. Lock it down completely. What

Privacy as Contextual Integrity - A lecture by Dr. Nissembaum of NYU

2008-04-16 Thread Ali, Saqib
Dr. Helen Nissenbaum of NYU gave an extremely interesting, engaging and stimulating lecture entitled Privacy in Context at UC Berkeley: http://security-basics.blogspot.com/2008/04/fde-privacy-as-contextual-integrity.html (audio recording and lecture notes)

Double Encryption Q

2008-04-16 Thread COMINT
Quick system scenario: You have packet [A]. It gets encrypted using an AES algo in a particular mode and we are left with [zA]. More data [B] is added to that encrypted packet. Now I have [zA]+[B] in one packet and I re-encrypt it with the same algo/key/mode. Have I just compromised the

Pi, randomness, entropy, unpredictability

2008-04-16 Thread travis+ml-cryptography
I've been working on the randomness and unpredictability this morning instead of doing my taxes, and found these links: http://crd.lbl.gov/~dhbailey/pi/ http://pisearch.lbl.gov/ The section on randomness, entropy, etc. is here:

Still locked up Shannon crypto work?

2008-04-16 Thread Ed Gerck
Consider Shannon. He didn’t do just information theory. Several years before, he did some other good things and some which are still locked up in the security of cryptography. Shannon's crypto work that is still [1986] locked up? This was said (*) by Richard W. Hamming on March 7, 1986. Hamming,

2factor

2008-04-16 Thread Leichter, Jerry
Anyone know anything about a company called 2factor (2factor.com)? They're pushing a system based on symmetric cryptography with, it appears, some kind of trusted authority. Factor of 100 faster than SSL. More secure, because it authenticates every message. No real technical data I can find on