On Thu, 24 Apr 2008, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
| Perry E. Metzger wrote:
| A pretty scary paper from the Usenix LEET conference:
|
| http://www.usenix.org/event/leet08/tech/full_papers/king/king_html/
|
| The paper describes how, by adding a very small number of gates to a
| microprocessor
I suppose Ken Thompson's, Reflections on Trusting Trust is appropriate
here. This kind of vulnerability has been known about for quite some
time, but did not have much relevance until the advent of ubiquitous
networking.
-
The
Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
Perry E. Metzger wrote:
A pretty scary paper from the Usenix LEET conference:
http://www.usenix.org/event/leet08/tech/full_papers/king/king_html/
The paper describes how, by adding a very small number of gates to a
microprocessor design (small enough that it would be
Leichter, Jerry wrote:
While analysis of the actual silicon will clearly have to be part of
any solution, it's going to be much harder than that:
1. Critical circuitry will likely be tamper-resistant.
Tamper-resistance techniques make it hard to see what's
On Sat, Apr 26, 2008 at 02:33:11AM -0400, Karsten Nohl wrote:
[...]
Assuming that hardware backdoors can be build, the interesting question
becomes how to defeat against them. Even after a particular triggering
string is identified, it is not clear whether software can be used to
detect
