Re: Who cares about side-channel attacks?

2008-11-03 Thread Tanja Lange
 Examples of side channel analysis on real systems I however have never
 seen in the field. Any rumors would be highly appreciated.

At Crypto'08 a team from Bochum demonstrated their side-channel attack on 
KeeLoq. There were some theoretical attacks before but the SCA really
broke it. 

KeeLoq is being used by some car manufacturers and by most garage door
manufacturers.

Regards
Tanja

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Re: Bitcoin P2P e-cash paper

2008-11-03 Thread John Levine
 As long as honest nodes control the most CPU power on the network,
 they can generate the longest chain and outpace any attackers.

But they don't.  Bad guys routinely control zombie farms of 100,000
machines or more.  People I know who run a blacklist of spam sending
zombies tell me they often see a million new zombies a day.

This is the same reason that hashcash can't work on today's Internet
-- the good guys have vastly less computational firepower than the bad
guys.

I also have my doubts about other issues, but this one is the killer.

R's,
John


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Re: Bitcoin P2P e-cash paper

2008-11-03 Thread Satoshi Nakamoto
 As long as honest nodes control the most CPU power on the network,
 they can generate the longest chain and outpace any attackers.

But they don't.  Bad guys routinely control zombie farms of 100,000
machines or more.  People I know who run a blacklist of spam sending
zombies tell me they often see a million new zombies a day.

This is the same reason that hashcash can't work on today's Internet
-- the good guys have vastly less computational firepower than the bad
guys.

Thanks for bringing up that point.

I didn't really make that statement as strong as I could have.  The requirement 
is that the good guys collectively have more CPU power than any single 
attacker. 

There would be many smaller zombie farms that are not big enough to overpower 
the network, and they could still make money by generating bitcoins.  The 
smaller farms are then the honest nodes.  (I need a better term than 
honest)  The more smaller farms resort to generating bitcoins, the higher the 
bar gets to overpower the network, making larger farms also too small to 
overpower it so that they may as well generate bitcoins too.  According to the 
long tail theory, the small, medium and merely large farms put together 
should add up to a lot more than the biggest zombie farm.

Even if a bad guy does overpower the network, it's not like he's instantly 
rich.  All he can accomplish is to take back money he himself spent, like 
bouncing a check.  To exploit it, he would have to buy something from a 
merchant, wait till it ships, then overpower the network and try to take his 
money back.  I don't think he could make as much money trying to pull a carding 
scheme like that as he could by generating bitcoins.  With a zombie farm that 
big, he could generate more bitcoins than everyone else combined.

The Bitcoin network might actually reduce spam by diverting zombie farms to 
generating bitcoins instead.

Satoshi Nakamoto

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