On Fri, Nov 14, 2008 at 02:29:24PM -0700, Chad Perrin wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 14, 2008 at 01:26:29PM +, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > (snicker) from the local firefox
> >
> >
> > en-us.add-ons.mozilla.com:443 uses an invalid security certificate.
> >
> > The certificate is not trusted becau
Okay I'm going to summarize this protocol as I understand it.
I'm filling in some operational details that aren't in the paper
by supplementing what you wrote with what my own "design sense"
tells me are critical missing bits or "obvious" methodologies for
use.
First, people spend compute
I'll try and hurry up and release the sourcecode as soon as possible to serve
as a reference to help clear up all these implementation questions.
Ray Dillinger (Bear) wrote:
> When a coin is spent, the buyer and seller digitally sign a (blinded)
> transaction record.
Only the buyer signs, and t
On Sat, 2008-11-15 at 12:43 +0800, Satoshi Nakamoto wrote:
> I'll try and hurry up and release the sourcecode as soon as possible
> to serve as a reference to help clear up all these implementation
> questions.
> Ray Dillinger (Bear) wrote:
> > When a coin is spent, the buyer and seller digital
Ray Dillinger wrote:
> One way to do this would be
> to have the person recieving the coin generate an asymmetric
> key pair, and then have half of it published with the
> transaction. In order to spend the coin later, s/he must
> demonstrate posession of the other half of the asymmetric
> key pair
Satoshi Nakamoto wrote:
> Fortunately, it's only necessary to keep a
> pending-transaction pool for the current best branch.
This requires that we know, that is to say an honest
well behaved peer whose communications and data storage
is working well knows, what the current best branch is -
but of
[Moderator's note: Top posting is considered untasteful. --Perry]
It doesn't need to be malicious. It depends on the situation.
For example, lots of corporations do SSL session inspection using
products like Bluecoat. The Bluecoat does a MiTM attack to expose the
plaintext for analysis, and exp
James A. Donald wrote:
> > Fortunately, it's only necessary to keep a
> > pending-transaction pool for the current best branch.
>
> This requires that we know, that is to say an honest
> well behaved peer whose communications and data storage
> is working well knows, what the current best branch i
