No, but a few years ago I looked at all the certs in IE
and Netscape and found that about 30% of them were from
companies that were at that time no longer in existence.
The expiries on those where-are-they-now certs were often
as not three decades into the future.
N.B., if you are willing to
Quoting Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.com:
Ray Dillinger b...@sonic.net writes:
I cannot derive a realistic threat model from the very general
statements in the slides.
(BTW, you mean threat, not threat *model*, in this instance.)
As just one obvious example of a realistic threat,
On Sat, May 2, 2009 at 12:33 PM, Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.com wrote:
As just one obvious example of a realistic threat, consider that there
are CAs that will happily sell you certificates that use SHA-1.
Various clever forgery attacks have been used against certs that use
MD5, see:
On Sun, May 3, 2009 at 4:35 PM, Christian Rechberger
christian.rechber...@tugraz.at wrote:
The design of DES facilitates this kind of throughput/cost gains on FPGAs.
Remember that the MD4 family (incl. SHA-1) was designed to be efficient on
32-bit CPUs. For these hash functions, it is much
