On 5 Oct 2009, at 16:04, Ian G wrote:
My view is that there is no demand for this as a service. The
apparent need for it is more a paper requirement that came out of
PKI world's search for a perfect product than any business need.
E.g., if you think you want it, you might be better reward
On Mon, Oct 5, 2009 at 8:42 AM, Alex Pankratov wrote:
> Does anyone know what's the state of affairs in this area ?
>
> This is probably slightly off-topic, but I can't think of
> a better place to ask about this sort of thing.
>
> I have spent a couple of days looking around the Internet,
> and t
On Sun, Oct 04, 2009 at 05:44:37PM -0600, Matt Ball wrote:
> > The question that a colleague and I have is there any cryptographic
> > purpose of computing the independent coefficients over the finite
> > field, Zp ?
>
> Here is a concrete example of information leakage when not using Zp.
>
Whe
Alex Pankratov wrote:
Does anyone know what's the state of affairs in this area ?
This is probably slightly off-topic, but I can't think of
a better place to ask about this sort of thing.
I have spent a couple of days looking around the Internet,
and things appear to be .. erm .. hectic and di
On Sat, 3 Oct 2009, Kevin W. Wall wrote:
Hi list...I have a question about Shamir's secret sharing.
According to the _Handbook of Applied Cryptography_
Shamir’s secret sharing (t,n) threshold scheme works as follows:
SUMMARY: a trusted party distributes shares of a secret S to n users.
R
> -Original Message-
> On Sunday, October 04, 2009 5:42 PM
> Alex Pankratov wrote:
>
> Does anyone know what's the state of affairs in this area ?
I think there are two factors. 1) This is complex problem and 2) Where
it might have really been required (i.e. the courts) it has not; the
On 04/10/2009 23:42, Alex Pankratov wrote:
I guess my main confusion at the moment is why large CAs of
Verisign's size not offering any standalone timestamping
services.
My view is that there is no demand for this as a service. The apparent
need for it is more a paper requirement that came
On Sun, 04 Oct 2009 23:42:22 +0200 Alex Pankratov
wrote:
>There is for example timestamp.verisign.com, but there is
>no documentation or description of it whatsoever.
>From European world plagued with qualified electronic signature
disease - timestamp servers usually are compatible with RFC
Good read:
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/sep2009/tc20090930_463595.htm
For more info:
http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/27840.wss
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1536414.1536440
This is just a proof of possibility, not (yet) feasibility.
saqib
http://enterpri
a good article about the technology and its implications:
http://www.physorg.com/news173556803.html
[Moderator's note: old news (we already had announcements on Vanish here
weeks ago), but in the last few days Ed Felten announced attacks on
Vanish:
http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/brea
Does anyone know what's the state of affairs in this area ?
This is probably slightly off-topic, but I can't think of
a better place to ask about this sort of thing.
I have spent a couple of days looking around the Internet,
and things appear to be .. erm .. hectic and disorganized.
There is fo
On Sat, Oct 3, 2009 at 12:42 AM, Kevin W. Wall wrote:
>
> The question that a colleague and I have is there any cryptographic
> purpose of computing the independent coefficients over the finite
> field, Zp ?
Here is a concrete example of information leakage when not using Zp.
Assume that the sec
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