Matt Crawford writes:
-+---
| Imagine a couple of hundred million devices with updatable
| firmware on them, and one or more rogue updates in the wild.
So should or should not an embedded system have a remote
management interface? If it does not, then a late discovered
flaw
Anyone care to give a layman's explanation of the attack? The
explanations I have seen assume a detailed knowledge of the way TLS/SSL
handle re-negotiation, which is not something that is easy to come by
without reading the RFC. (As opposed to the main protocol, where one can
find textbook
On 11/10/2009 09:44 AM, Jerry Leichter wrote:
Not that this should block the use of devices like the ZTIC! They're
still much more secure than the alternatives. But it's important to keep
in mind the vulnerabilities we engineer *into* systems at the same time
we engineer others *out*.
On Wed, Nov 11, 2009 at 10:03:45AM +0800, Sandy Harris wrote:
C(x) = H1(H1(x) || H2(x))
This requires two hash(x) operations. A naive implementation needs
two passes through the data and avoiding that does not appear to
be trivial. This is not ideal since you seem very concerned about
On Nov 11, 2009, at 10:36 AM, Matt Crawford wrote:
On Nov 10, 2009, at 8:44 AM, Jerry Leichter wrote:
Whether or not it can, it demonstrates the hazards of freezing
implementations of crypto protocols into ROM: Imagine a world in
which there are a couple of hundred million ZTIC's or
At Tue, 10 Nov 2009 20:11:50 -0500,
d...@geer.org wrote:
|
| This is the first attack against TLS that I consider to be
| the real deal. To really fix it is going to require a change to
| all affected clients and servers. Fortunately, Eric Rescorla
| has a protocol extension that
On Nov 11, 2009, at 10:03 AM, Sandy Harris wrote:
On 11/8/09, Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn zo...@zooko.com wrote:
Therefore I've been thinking about how to make Tahoe-LAFS robust against
the possibility that SHA-256 will turn out to be insecure.
NIST are dealing with that via the AHS process.
Ben Laurie benl google.com writes:
Anyway, I should mention my own paper on this subject (with Abe
Singer) from NSPW 2008, Take The Red Pill _and_ The Blue Pill:
http://www.links.org/files/nspw36.pdf
In writing on page 2 that you do not need to secure what you
put in an Amazon shopping basket
On Wed, Nov 11, 2009 at 10:57:04AM -0500, Jonathan Katz wrote:
Anyone care to give a layman's explanation of the attack? The
explanations I have seen assume a detailed knowledge of the way TLS/SSL
handle re-negotiation,
The re-negotiation handshake does not *commit* both parties in the
new
On Wed, Nov 11, 2009 at 09:42:21PM -0500, Jerry Leichter wrote:
[...]
If one organization distributes the dongles, they could accept
only updates signed by that organization. We have pretty good
methods for keeping private keys secret at the enterprise level,
so the risks should be manageable.
Followup from the workshop:
http://www.technologyreview.com/computing/23951/
saqib
http://enterprise20.squarespace.com
On Thu, Nov 12, 2009 at 1:23 PM, Ali, Saqib docbook@gmail.com wrote:
ACM Workshop on November 13th (yes it is Friday the 13th) will cover the the
topic of Searching
http://www.securegoose.org/
Attacks twitter to post the HTTP auth header in a tweet from the victim...
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On 11 Nov 2009 at 10:57, Jonathan Katz wrote:
Anyone care to give a layman's explanation of the attack? The
explanations I have seen assume a detailed knowledge of the way TLS/SSL
handle re-negotiation, which is not something that is easy to come by
without reading the RFC. (As opposed to
On Wed, Nov 11, 2009 at 9:53 AM, d...@geer.org wrote:
Matt Crawford writes:
-+---
| Imagine a couple of hundred million devices with updatable
| firmware on them, and one or more rogue updates in the wild.
So should or should not an embedded system have a remote
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