On 2 July 2010 13:19, Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org wrote:
http://www.technologyreview.com/printer_friendly_article.aspx?id=25670channel=Briefingssection=Microprocessors
Tuesday, June 29, 2010
Nanoscale Random Number Circuit to Secure Future Chips
Intel unveils a circuit that can pump out
Have they forgotten the enormous amount of suspicion last time they
tried this?
More likely they're expecting everyone else to have forgotten about being
suspicious.
/r$
--
STSM, WebSphere Appliance Architect
https://www.ibm.com/developerworks/mydeveloperworks/blogs/soma/
Ben Laurie b...@google.com writes:
On 2 July 2010 13:19, Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org wrote:
http://www.technologyreview.com/printer_friendly_article.aspx?id=25670channel=Briefingssection=Microprocessors
Tuesday, June 29, 2010
Nanoscale Random Number Circuit to Secure Future Chips
Intel unveils
On Tue, 13 Jul 2010 03:58:51 +1200 Peter Gutmann
pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote:
Ben Laurie b...@google.com writes:
On 2 July 2010 13:19, Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org wrote:
http://www.technologyreview.com/printer_friendly_article.aspx?id=25670channel=Briefingssection=Microprocessors
On Jul 12, 2010, at 11:22 AM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
The
literature makes it clear at this point that short of carefully
tearing apart and analyzing the entire chip, you're not going to catch
subtle behavioral changes designed to allow attackers backdoor
access.
I happen to be re-reading
On Mon, Jul 12, 2010 at 12:22:51PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
BTW, let me note that if Intel wanted to gimmick their chips to make
them untrustworthy, there is very little you could do about it. The
literature makes it clear at this point that short of carefully
tearing apart and
On Mon, Jul 12, 2010 at 12:22:51PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Plugging in an
external unit is not going to happen in practice. If it isn't nearly
free and built in, it won't be used.
I completely agree. But HW RNGs are a pain in a lot of ways- modern chip
design libraries don't include
On Mon, Jul 12, 2010 at 01:13:10PM -0400, Jack Lloyd wrote:
I think it's important to make the distinction between trusting Intel
not to have made it actively malicious, and trusting them to have
gotten it perfectly correct in such a way that it cannot fail.
Fortunately, the second problem,
The skype client was reverse engineered several years ago:
@inproceedings{biondi06silver,
title = {Silver Needle in the Skype},
author = {Philippe Biondi and Fabrice Desclaux},
note =
\url{www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-europe-06/bh-eu-06-biondi/bh-eu-06-biondi-up.pdf},
booktitle =
On Mon, 12 Jul 2010, Ben Laurie wrote:
On 2 July 2010 13:19, Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org wrote:
http://www.technologyreview.com/printer_friendly_article.aspx?id=25670channel=Briefingssection=Microprocessors
Tuesday, June 29, 2010
Nanoscale Random Number Circuit to Secure Future Chips
Intel
I don't know if the new crack reveals anything new. We have
a writeup about the Skype protection techniques in
Surreptitious Software, our book on security-through-obscurity.
(Sorry for the blatant self-promotion).
I appreciate the self-promotion. My only request is that you include
ISBN,
On Mon, 12 Jul 2010, Eric Murray wrote:
Then there's FIPS- current 140 doesn't have a provision for HW RNG.
They certify software RNG only, presumeably because proving a HW RNG to be
random enough is very difficult. So what's probably the primary market
(companies who want to meet FIPS) isn't
On Mon, Jul 12, 2010 at 03:37:45PM -0400, Paul Wouters wrote:
On Mon, 12 Jul 2010, Eric Murray wrote:
Then there's FIPS- current 140 doesn't have a provision for HW RNG.
They certify software RNG only, presumeably because proving a HW RNG to be
random enough is very difficult. So what's
On 2010-07-11 10:11 AM, Brandon Enright wrote:
On Fri, 9 Jul 2010 21:16:30 -0400 (EDT) Jonathan
Thornburgjth...@astro.indiana.edu wrote:
The following usenet posting from 1993 provides an
interesting bit (no pun itended) of history on RSA key
sizes. The key passage is the last paragraph,
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