RE: U.S. seeks OSCE pact on biometric passports

2003-09-03 Thread Trei, Peter
Duncan Frissell[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Anyone have any pointers to non destructive methods of rendering Smart Chips unreadable? Just curious. On Mon, 1 Sep 2003, R. A. Hettinga wrote: http://dynamic.washtimes.com/print_story.cfm?StoryID=20030901-124025-4029 r The

Re: PRNG design document?

2003-09-03 Thread Ralf-P. Weinmann
On Fri, Aug 29, 2003 at 03:43:40PM -0400, Tim Dierks wrote: [snip] Allow me to clarify my problem a little. I'm commonly engaged to review source code for a security audit, some such programs include a random number generator, many of which are of ad-hoc design. The nature of such audits

Re: Is cryptography where security took the wrong branch?

2003-09-03 Thread Michael Shields
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Ian Grigg [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: For example, he states that 28% of wireless networks use WEP, and 1% of web servers use SSL, but doesn't explain why SSL is a success and WEP is a failure :-) Actually, he does; slide 11 is titled Why has SSL succeeded?, and

Re: PRNG design document?

2003-09-03 Thread Peter Gutmann
Anton Stiglic [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: It is important to chose both a random seed and random key, and FIPS 140 has no provision for this. Yes it does, you just have to interpret it correctly. The post-processed pool output [from the cryptlib generator] is not sent directly to the caller

Re: U.S. seeks OSCE pact on biometric passports

2003-09-03 Thread David Honig
At 04:50 PM 9/2/03 -0400, Duncan Frissell wrote: Anyone have any pointers to non destructive methods of rendering Smart Chips unreadable? Just curious. DCF Perhaps I'm being dense but how could this be non-destructive? Do you mean non-obvious? Or reversible? If the usual microwave games

Re: invoicing with PKI

2003-09-03 Thread James A. Donald
-- On 1 Sep 2003 at 12:23, Ian Grigg wrote: I suspect the widest use of public key crypto in a non-PKI context would be SSH, which opportunistically generates keys rather than invite the user to fund a PKI. According to this page [1], there may or may not be 2,400k SSH servers This of

Re: invoicing with PKI

2003-09-03 Thread James A. Donald
-- On 1 Sep 2003 at 19:17, Hadmut Danisch wrote: Is cryptography where security took the wrong branch? True names is where security took the wrong branch. The entire PKI structure has been rejected. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG

Re: invoicing with PKI

2003-09-03 Thread Ian Grigg
Peter Gutmann wrote: Hadmut Danisch [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: There was an interesting speech held on the Usenix conference by Eric Rescorla (http://www.rtfm.com/TooSecure-usenix.pdf, unfortunately I did not have the time to visit the conference) about cryptographic (real world) protocols

Re: Is cryptography where security took the wrong branch?

2003-09-03 Thread Peter Gutmann
Ian Grigg [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: There appear to be a number of metrics that have been suggested: a. nunber of design wins b. penetration into equivalent unprotected market c. number of actual attacks defeated d. subjective good at the application level e. worthless

Re: Is cryptography where security took the wrong branch?

2003-09-03 Thread Eric Rescorla
Ian Grigg [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Eric Rescorla wrote: Ian Grigg [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: I think it's pretty inarguable that SSL is a big success. One thing that has been on my mind lately is how to define success of a crypto protocol. I.e., how to take your thoughts, and my

Re: invoicing with PKI

2003-09-03 Thread Peter Gutmann
Peter Gutmann wrote: It's no less secure than what's being done now, and since you can make it completely invisible to the user at least it'll get used. If all new MTA releases automatically generated a self-signed cert and enabled STARTTLS, we'd see opportunistic email encryption adopted at a

Re: invoicing with PKI

2003-09-03 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler
At 11:41 PM 9/2/2003 -0700, James A. Donald wrote: True names is where security took the wrong branch. The entire PKI structure has been rejected. x.509 identity certificates are business processes ... not a cryptography process. as I've mentioned elsewhere many of the institutions that looked

Re: Is cryptography where security took the wrong branch?

2003-09-03 Thread Michael Shields
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Ian Grigg [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: One thing that has been on my mind lately is how to define success of a crypto protocol. There are two needs a security protocol can address. One is the need to prevent or mitigate real attacks; the other is to make people feel