Re: Tinc's response to Linux's answer to MS-PPTP

2003-09-28 Thread Eric Rescorla
M Taylor [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: On Fri, Sep 26, 2003 at 06:26:16PM -0700, Joseph Ashwood wrote: Both SSL and SSH have had their security problems . . , as perfect as Peter Gutmann would let us believe. They may not be perfect but in neither case can Mallet do as much damage as

Re: Reliance on Microsoft called risk to U.S. security

2003-09-28 Thread Paul Walker
On Sat, Sep 27, 2003 at 01:51:52PM -0400, Jeroen C.van Gelderen wrote: Are you familiar with the KeyKOS and EROS operating systems and/or Stiegler's CapDesk, a secure desktop in Java? They are all based on the Without wishing to belittle the authors (EROS is definitely impressive; I'm not

Re: Reliance on Microsoft called risk to U.S. security

2003-09-28 Thread William Allen Simpson
Jeroen C.van Gelderen wrote: On Saturday, Sep 27, 2003, at 15:48 US/Eastern, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: You have not met my users! Indeed, but I'm here to learn :) ... something is wrong. Why would she click YES? ... Because I'm an optimist I believe that Alice will read the dialog

A quick question...

2003-09-28 Thread Paul Walker
Hi, Apologies in advance for the vagueness of the question... Talking to a friend the other day, he was telling me about a potential loophole with SHA-1 hashes protected by an RSA signature. Basically, he seemed to think that with an SHA hash of a suitable length (say, 2^20), the hash could be

Re: Reliance on Microsoft called risk to U.S. security

2003-09-28 Thread Zooko
Jeroen C. van Gelderen [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: There is no way around asking the user because he is the ultimate authority when it comes to making trust decisions. (Side-stepping the issues in a (corporate) environment where the owner of the machine is entitled to restrict its users in

Re: Reliance on Microsoft called risk to U.S. security

2003-09-28 Thread Jeroen C . van Gelderen
On Saturday, Sep 27, 2003, at 20:31 US/Eastern, Zooko wrote: Jeroen C. van Gelderen [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: There is no way around asking the user because he is the ultimate authority when it comes to making trust decisions. (Side-stepping the issues in a (corporate) environment where the owner

Re: Tinc's response to Linux's answer to MS-PPTP

2003-09-28 Thread Guus Sliepen
On Sat, Sep 27, 2003 at 07:58:14PM +0100, M Taylor wrote: Perhaps a HMAC per chunk, rather than per the payload of a single UDP datagram. I suspect per every 5 UDP datagrams, roughly ~7000 bytes of payload may work. This will increase latency. That would not work either. It would have the

Re: Reliance on Microsoft called risk to U.S. security

2003-09-28 Thread J├╝rgen Botz
On Sat, 27 Sep 2003, Jeroen C.van Gelderen wrote: Could it not ask the user? My Apple regularly asks for decisions of this sort, and remembers the results. So do (popular firewall) products on the PC. Now, most of these questions are too technical in nature but point remains that asking question

Re: quantum hype

2003-09-28 Thread Peter Fairbrother
I promised some links about the 5/6 cloning figure. You've had a few experimental ones, here are some theory ones. Cloning machines: http://www.fi.muni.cz/usr/buzek/mypapers/96pra1844.pdf Theoretically optimal cloning machines: http://www.gap-optique.unige.ch/Publications/Pdf/PRL02153.pdf 1/6

Re: quantum hype

2003-09-28 Thread Dave Howe
Peter Fairbrother wrote: I promised some links about the 5/6 cloning figure. You've had a few experimental ones, here are some theory ones. has anyone with better number theory / probability skills than me taken a stab at exactly *how* accurate cloning would have to be (and how many clones you

Re: Tinc's response to Linux's answer to MS-PPTP

2003-09-28 Thread Ian Grigg
M Taylor wrote: Oh, and they fixed their flaws. SSHv1 is not recommended for use at all, and most systems use SSHv2 now which is based upon a draft IETF standard. SSL went through SSLv1, SSLv2, SSLv3, TLSv1.0, and TLSv1.1 is a draft IETF standard. It is curious, is it not, that there has

Re: Reliance on Microsoft called risk to U.S. security

2003-09-28 Thread Bill Frantz
At 8:12 AM -0700 9/27/03, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Fri, 26 Sep 2003, Bill Frantz wrote: The real problem is that the viewer software, whether it is an editor, PDF viewer, or a computer language interpreter, runs with ALL the user's privileges. If we ran these programs with a minimum of

Re: A quick question...

2003-09-28 Thread Greg Rose
At 11:53 PM 9/27/2003 +0100, Paul Walker wrote: Talking to a friend the other day, he was telling me about a potential loophole with SHA-1 hashes protected by an RSA signature. Basically, he seemed to think that with an SHA hash of a suitable length (say, 2^20), the hash could be cubed and still

Re: A quick question...

2003-09-28 Thread Paul Walker
On Mon, Sep 29, 2003 at 08:33:59AM +1000, Greg Rose wrote: common values. It also relies on using some rawly implemented RSA, so that all that is in the RSA payload is the hash, and nothing else. This violates all the standards that specify that the payload should be padded The code which