At 07:02 PM 12/15/2003 -0500, Jerrold Leichter wrote:
However, this advantage is there only because there are so few smart cards,
and so few smart card enabled applications, around.
A software only, networked smart card would solve the
chicken and egg problem. One such solution is
Tamper resistant
On Mon, 15 Dec 2003, Jerrold Leichter wrote:
| This is quite an advantage of smart cards.
However, this advantage is there only because there are so few smart cards,
and so few smart card enabled applications, around.
Strangely enough, Carl Ellison assumed that you would have at most one
There have been more press releases about quantum crypto products
lately.
I will summarize my opinion simply -- even if they can do what is
advertised, they aren't very useful. They only provide link security,
and at extremely high cost. You can easily just run AES+HMAC on all
the bits crossing
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Quoting Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
I don't see any value added by cipher1 - what's the point?
The message is encrypted, i.e, cipher1, then cipher1 is encrypted yeilding
cipher2.
Since symmetric_key1 of cipher1 is RSA_Encrypt(sender's private key), access
to
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| means that some entity is supposed to trust the kernel (what else?). If
| two entities, who do not completely trust each other, are supposed to both
| trust such a kernel, something very very fishy is going on.
Why? If I'm going to use a time-shared machine, I have to trust that the
OS
Jerrold Leichter wrote:
We've met the enemy, and he is us. *Any* secure computing kernel that can do
the kinds of things we want out of secure computing kernels, can also do the
kinds of things we *don't* want out of secure computing kernels.
I don't understand why you say that. You can build
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Quoting Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Yes, but you could know all this from cipher2 and RSA of SHA1(message),
so I still don't see what value is added by cipher1.
Without cipher1, implying (iv1, RSA(SHA1(message) || key1)) it is impossible
to determine the
Matt, in your note below you explained finally what you really want: a
secure combination of encryption and signature. I explain below why your
current scheme is insecure. There are simple secure designs. With Yitchak
Gertner, a student, we recently proved security of one such practical
*
DIMACS/PORTIA Workshop on Privacy-Preserving Data Mining
March 15 - 16, 2004
DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ
Organizers:
Cynthia Dwork, Microsoft, dwork at microsoft.com
Benny Pinkas, HP
At 16:36 17/12/2003, Matt wrote:
Ben, Amir, et.al.
I see that cipher1 has no transparent value. Therefore, the XML-Encrypted
message see ( http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/ ) must transport
(1) symmetric_IV
(2) Sign_RSA_Receiver_PK(symmetric_Key)
(3) cipher
(4) Sign_RSA_Sender(SHA1(message))
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2003 12:29 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [NEC] #2.12: The RIAA Succeeds Where the CypherPunks Failed
NEC @ Shirky.com, a mailing list about Networks, Economics, and Culture
Published periodically / #2.12 / December 17, 2003
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