Paying for drinks with wave br of the hand

2004-04-22 Thread R. A. Hettinga


Wednesday, April 14, 2004

Paying for drinks with wave
 of the hand
Club-goers in Spain get implanted chips for ID, payment purposes
Posted: April 14, 2004
5:00 p.m. Eastern

By Sherrie Gossett

 Being recognized has never been easier for VIP patrons of the Baja Beach
Club in Barcelona, Spain.

 Like a scene out of a science-fiction movie, all it takes is a
syringe-injected microchip implant for the beautiful men and women of the
nightclub scene to breeze past a reader that recognizes their identity,
credit balance and even automatically opens doors to exclusive areas of the
club for them.

 They can buy drinks and food with a wave of their hand and don't need to
worry about losing a credit card or wallet.

 By simply passing by our reader, the Baja Beach Club will know who you
are and what your credit balance is, Conrad K. Chase explains. Chase is
director of the Baja Beach Club in Barcelona.

 From the moment of their implantation they will also have free entry and
access to the VIP area, he said.

 In the popular club, which boasts a dance floor that can accommodate
3,000, streamlined services and convenience matter to Chase's VIP customers.

 Baja Beach Clubs International is the first firm to employ the VeriPay
System, developed by Applied Digital's VeriChip Corporation and announced
at an international conference in Paris last year. The company touts this
application of the chip implant as an advance over credit cards and smart
cards, which, absent biometrics and appropriate safeguard technologies, are
subject to theft resulting in identity fraud.

 Palm Beach-based Applied Digital Solutions (NASDAQ:ADSXD) unveiled the
original VeriChip immediately after the 9-11 tragedy. Similar to pet
identification chips, the VeriChip is a syringe-injectable radio frequency
identification microchip that can be read from a few feet away by either a
hand-held scanner or by the implantee walking through a portal scanner.
Information can be wirelessly written to the chip, which contains a unique
10-digit identification number.

 Media seized on the novelty factor of the chip implant, driving it to
worldwide headlines in 2001.

 Last year, Art Kranzley, senior vice president at MasterCard, speculated
on possible future electronic payment media: We're certainly looking at
designs like key fobs. It could be in a pen or a pair of earrings.
Ultimately, it could be embedded in anything ñ someday, maybe even under
the skin.

 Chase calls the chip implant the wave of the future.

 The nightclub director has been implanted along with stars from the
Spanish version of the TV show Big Brother.

 I know many people who want to be implanted, he said. Actually, almost
everybody has piercings, tattoos or silicone.

 Will the implant only be of use at the Baja?

 The objective of this technology is to bring an ID system to a global
level that will destroy the need to carry ID documents and credit cards,
Chase said.

 During a recent American radio interview, Chase said the CEO of VeriChip,
Dr. Keith Bolton, had told him that the company's goal was to market the
VeriChip as a global implantable identification system.

 With only 900 people implanted worldwide, though, the global mandate isn't
exactly around the corner, and current applications are extremely limited.

 Chase added, The VeriChip that we implant at Baja will not only be for
the Baja, but is also useful for whatever other enterprise that makes use
of this technology.

 He also alluded to plans for FN Herstal, which manufactures Browning and
Smith and Wesson firearms, to develop an implant-firearm system that would
make a firearm functional only to the individual implanted with its
corresponding microchip. A scanner in the gun would be designed to
recognize the owner.

 Chase's mention of the FN Herstal-Verichip partnership came a full week
before it's formal announcement by Applied Digital yesterday.

 Chase believes all gun owners should be required to have a microchip
implanted in their hand to be able to own a gun. While yesterday's
Associated Press story on the prototype is primarily from the angle of
police usage, WND reported two years ago that from the he outset of the
company's acquisition of its Digital Angel implant patent ñ said to be
GPS trackable ñ Applied touted the implant as a potential universal method
of gun control.

Chase also claimed that the VeriChip company had told him that the Italian
government was preparing to implant government workers.

 We are the only company today offering human implantable ID technology,
said Scott R. Silverman, chairman and chief executive officer of Applied
Digital Solutions. We believe the market opportunity for this technology
is substantial, and high-profile successes such as in Spain will serve as
catalysts for broader adoption.

 Since 1999, the Applied Digital Solutions has boasted that it also has a

[Publicity-list]: DIMACS Workshop on Mobile and Wireless Security

2004-04-22 Thread Linda Casals

DIMACS Workshop on Mobile and Wireless Security 
 June 15 - 17 , 2004
 DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ

  Bill Arbaugh, University of Maryland, [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Presented under the auspices of the Special Focus on Communication
Security and Information Privacy.

The rapid growth of both voice and data wireless communications has
resulted in several serious security problems in both the voice and 
data spaces. Unfortunately, many of the early security mistakes made 
with wireless voice communications were repeated with data
communications, i.e. the use of flawed authentication and
confidentiality algorithms. For example, the standards committee for 
802.11 left many of the difficult security issues such as key
management and a robust authentication mechanism as open problems. 
This has led many organizations to use either a permanent fixed
cryptographic variable or no encryption with their wireless networks. 
Since wireless networks provide an adversary a network access point
that is beyond the physical security controls of the organization, 
security can be a problem. Similarly, attacks against WEP, the
link-layer security protocol for 802.11 networks can exploit design 
failures to successfully attack such networks. This workshop will 
focus on addressing the many outstanding issues that remain in
wireless cellular and WLAN networking such as (but not limited to):
Management and monitoring; ad-hoc trust establishment; secure roaming
between overlay networks; availability and denial of service
mitigation; and network and link layer security protocols. We will 
seek to extend work on ad hoc networking from a non-adversarial
setting, assuming a trusted environment, to a more realistic setting
in which an adversary may attempt to disrupt communication. We will
investigate a variety of approaches to securing ad hoc networks, in 
particular ways to take advantage of their inherent redundancy 
(multiple routes between nodes), replication, and new cryptographic 
schemes such as threshold cryptography.


Participants interested in presenting talks may contact the organizer.


Pre-registration deadline: June 8, 2004

Please see website for registration information.

Information on participation, registration, accomodations, and travel 
can be found at:


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Re: Cryptography Expert Paul Kocher Warns: Future DVDs Prime Target for Piracy, Pay TV Foreshadows Challenges

2004-04-22 Thread Steve Schear
At 10:40 AM 4/20/2004, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
While it's unfortunate that security on the current DVD format is broken
and can't be reprogrammed, HD is what really matters. Once studios release
high-definition content, there will be little or no distinction between
studio-quality and consumer-quality, said Kocher. This means that HD is
probably Hollywood's one and only chance to get security right.
The major problem facing Hollywood in protecting their HD content is that 
it runs smack up against an installed base of millions of HDTVs with only 
ACV (analog component video), including mine.  These consumers were 
promised by the FCC that they would not be left to twist in the wind when 
newer set-top-box to TV connections evolved and it does not appear 
technically practical to retrofit these sets to accommodate encrypted DVI 
or Firewire inputs.  The FCC has already stated they do not support 
broadcast flags for pay content and unless they back-peddle on this 
Hollywood appears to have only three other options: restrict the 
availability of HD content to cable broadcasters, prevent the sale of 
devices that can capture HD quality content from ACV, or insist that the 
resolution of ACV signals be degraded when copy restricted content is 
being broadcast.

The first will bring great howls from existing HDTV owners with only 
ACV.  The second is probably impractical since illegal devices (little more 
than 3-channel A-D converters on a PCI card) are sure to be produced and 
only a small number in the hands of skilled movie releasing groups are 
required to widely disseminate their content via the Internet.  The third 
option is also sure to bring major complaints from existing set owners.


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Re: Cryptography Expert Paul Kocher Warns: Future DVDs Prime Target for Piracy, Pay TV Foreshadows Challenges

2004-04-22 Thread Bill Frantz
At 10:40 AM -0700 4/20/04, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
While it's unfortunate that security on the current DVD format is broken
and can't be reprogrammed, HD is what really matters. Once studios release
high-definition content, there will be little or no distinction between
studio-quality and consumer-quality, said Kocher. This means that HD is
probably Hollywood's one and only chance to get security right.

According to Kocher, Hollywood is following a path common to other
industries facing similar problems. Typically, first-generation security
systems fail irrecoverably, but later generations are designed to recover
from failures, Kocher said. As an example, he cites K-band (big dish)
satellite TV systems, which suffered from devastating piracy because
security flaws could not be corrected. Having learned this lesson, modern
pay TV systems place critical security components in smart cards or
security modules that can be replaced. While this approach is not optimal
because hardware upgrades are expensive, it has enabled the industry to
keep piracy at survivable levels.

Continuously changing the protection on permanent storage media is a much
more difficult problem than changing broadcast protection.  With broadcast,
you give current subscribers the new smart card, change what's broadcast,
and away you go.  With permanent storage media, once the protection is
broken, the content is still available to pirate.  Only new releases can be
protected with new protection schemes.

These technical considerations would seem to lead to a marketing strategy
of short product cycles driven by big advertising campaigns, to reap as
much profit as possible while piracy is still difficult.  This approach is
not new to the movie industry.  In recent years, the number of theaters
opening a big movie release has increased greatly, and the time it runs in
theaters has become shorter.

It is ironic to compare the marketing strategy of reaping most of the
profit quickly, with the public policy stance that long copyright terms are
necessary to provide incentive for production.

Cheers - Bill

Bill Frantz| There's nothing so clear as a | Periwinkle
(408)356-8506  | vague idea you haven't written | 16345 Englewood Ave | down yet. -- Dean Tribble | Los Gatos, CA 95032

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Bank Transfer via Quantum Cryptography Based on Entangled Photons

2004-04-22 Thread R. A. Hettinga

The old hype-meter pegs so much the needle's bent...


Quantum Cryptography live
World Premiere: Bank Transfer via Quantum Cryptography Based on Entangled
 Press conference and demonstration of the ground-breaking experiment:
 21 April 2004, 11:30, Vienna City Hall ñ Steinsaal

 A collaboration of:
 group of Professor Anton Zeilinger, Vienna University; ARC Seibersdorf
research GmbH; City of Vienna; Wien Kanal Abwassertechnologien GmbH and
Bank Austria ñ Creditanstalt

Einladung (pdf-file, german)
Invitation (pdf-file, english)

 Presse-Information (pdf-file, german)
Press release (pdf-file, english)

Where to get Pictures of the Event :: Fotoinformation (pdf-file)

Poster 1 (pdf-file, german)
Poster 2 (pdf-file, german)
Poster 3 (pdf-file, german)
Poster 4 (pdf-file, german)
Poster 5 (pdf-file, german)

For further Information please contact:
 Julia Petschinka
 ARC Seibersdorf research; Information Technologies
 Phone: +43-(0)50550-4161
 Fax: +43-(0)50550-4150
 Mobile: +43-(0)664-8251064

 Andrea Aglibut
 Institut fuer Experimentalphysik, University of Vienna
 Phone: +43-(1)4277-51166
 Fax: +43-(1)4277-9512
 Mobile: +43-(0)664-60277-51166

R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Bank transfer via quantum crypto

2004-04-22 Thread Ivan Krstic
On /. today:

An anonymous reader writes with today's announcement that the Austrian 
project for Quantum Cryptography[1] made the world's first Bank Transfer 
via Quantum Cryptography Based on Entangled Photons; see also 
Einstein-Podolski-Rosen Paradoxon[2]. (For more background, see the 
recent Slashdot post Quantum Cryptography Leaving the Lab.[3])

I have to agree with Perry on this one: I simply can't see a compelling 
reason for the push currently being given to ridiculously overpriced 
implementations of what started off as a lab toy, and what offers - in 
all seriousness - almost no practical benefits over the proper use of 
conventional techniques. Besides, any of the ultrasecret applications 
that *might* (I remain very skeptical) call for such a level of 
confidentiality - things like military communication or diplomatic 
message exchange between a country and its ambassadors - are all too 
likely to be out of the range currently offered by these QC setups (last 
I read, if I'm not mistaken, it was about 50 km or ~30 miles). Fine, the 
range might improve - but I doubt that the amount of money and hassle 
required to set these up will.

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nettime diebold law firm aware of lgal risks

2004-04-22 Thread R. A. Hettinga

--- begin forwarded text

Date: Wed, 21 Apr 2004 21:38:47 -0100
From: nettime's_roving_reporter [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: nettime diebold law firm aware of lgal risks
Reply-To: nettime's_roving_reporter [EMAIL PROTECTED]

 [ via [EMAIL PROTECTED]],1413,82~1865~2095811,00.html 

   Diebold knew of legal risks

   Attorneys warned firm that use of uncertified vote-counting software
   violated state law

   By Ian Hoffman, STAFF WRITER

   Attorneys for Diebold Election Systems Inc. warned in late November
   that its use of uncertified vote-counting software in Alameda County
   violated California election law and broke its $12.7 million contract
   with Alameda County.

   Soon after, a review of internal legal memos obtained by the Oakland
   Tribune shows Diebold's attorneys at the Los Angeles office of Jones
   Day realized the McKinney, Texas-based firm also faced a threat of
   criminal charges and exile from California elections.

   Yet despite warnings from the state's chief elections officer, Diebold
   continued fielding poorly tested, faulty software and hardware in at
   least two of California's largest urban counties during the Super
   Tuesday primary, when e-voting temporarily broke down and voters were
   turned away at the polls.

   Other documentation obtained by the Tribune shows that the latest
   approved versions of Diebold's vote-counting software in this state
   cast doubt on the firm's claims elsewhere that it has fixed multiple
   security vulnerabilities unearthed in the last year.

   In California those issues can be addressed, said Diebold spokesman
   David Bear. They were addressed in Maryland, and they could be
   changed in California.

   California elections officials said they are perplexed that Diebold
   apparently hasn't changed practices since a December audit revealed
   uncertified software running in every county that it serves.

   Diebold may suffer from gross incompetence, gross negligence. I don't
   know whether there's any malevolence involved, said a senior
   California elections official who spoke on condition of anonymity. I
   don't know why they've acted the way they've acted and the way they're
   continuing to act. Notwithstanding their rhetoric, they have not
   learned any lessons in terms of dealing with this secretary (of

   The memos show that for months, Diebold attorneys at Jones Day have
   been exploring ways to keep the nation's second-largest electronic
   voting provider from losing an eighth of the national market.

   Jones Day partner Daniel D. McMillan declined to comment on the
   content of the documents except to confirm they were internal papers
   from his office. He warned against drawing conclusions from the firm's

   Diebold's legal team appears to have been exploring whether California
   Secretary of State Kevin Shelley has the power to investigate the
   company's practices. The memos reflect an argument that the
   regulations by which California approves voting equipment for
   elections may never have been properly codified and are unenforceable.

   Diebold's Bear said his company is cooperating with Shelley's office.

   I've been working with the SOS and we're hopeful we can move forward
   and the advantages of electronic voting can be continued to be offered
   to the citizens of California, he said. We will continue to work
   with state and local elections officials to address any and all
   elections issues.

   The law firm's memos reflect a corporate defense firm on a
   $500,000-a-month campaign to protect Diebold.

   It is a critical moment for Diebold, for electronic voting in
   California and for at least some of the 19 counties statewide that
   purchased Diebold voting systems for more than $50 million.

   On Wednesday, state elections officials begin debating their advice to
   Shelley on whether to disallow some or all Diebold voting systems, or
   all touchscreen voting machines, from the November elections.

   What Shelley decides will be a test of state authority over makers of
   the computers that will determine the electoral votes in California
   and other states. His decision also could send some of California's
   largest counties -- Alameda and San Diego -- scrambling for other ways
   to count votes six months from now.

   Voting experts say the industry's factories and printing plants
   probably can handle the extra demand for replacement voting machines
   and paper ballots, given at least three months' notice. But Shelley's
   decision also could unleash a barrage of lawsuits that could mire
   orders of equipment and ballots in legal wrangling over who will pay
   for them.

   At the center of those battles will be Jones Day. The firm's internal
   memoranda show its attorneys considered the idea of calling a new bit
   of uncertified voting software